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Avoiding Mediocrity Not Necessary For Sixers

By Derek Bodner | April 11, 2015 - 10:12 am | Features, Sixers

“Mediocrity is bad” has become a rallying cry for many Sixers fans who support what Sam Hinkie and the Sixers front office are doing. The general sentiment is true, as getting to great without salary cap flexibility and with mediocre draft picks is a tough proposition.

This has led some to write that the Sixers plan is to catapult from bad to great, skipping that middle ground entirely. If NBA relevancy is measured on a 1-to-5 scale, with 1 beind horrible and 5 being title contender, Sam Hinkie intends to skip levels 2 and 3 entirely. According to some, at least.

The latest to speculate that is marketplace.org, arriving at that conclusion after interviewing Michael Sokolove, who wrote a nice article on the Sixers for NY Times Magazine. There’s a part that I don’t necessarily agree with (well, there are many parts, including the rant about ethics in sports. But that’s been covered extensively in the past, and this is what I want to focus on).

“It’s a gamble designed to — eventually — propel the Sixers directly from the lowest ranks to a championship team”

Sure, there are instances of teams going from bad to great, the Oklahoma City Thunder being the prime example. The Thunder, who cared less about wins during Durant’s first two seasons than they did about player development, won 20 games in Durant’s first year, 23 during his second year, and 50 in his 3rd.

If the Sixers do such a great job of hitting on their draft picks that multiple young players develop into superstars sooner rather than later, that quick jump from also-ran to contender could happen instantly. But, like most things when discussing the Thunder, they’re the exception, not the rule.

Being bad certainly helps ignite the process. Until they get their franchise level player, being bad, and having the most valuable draft picks they can have, is beneficial. And the Sixers are showing no signs of having pressure to reach mediocre, which allows them to look beyond immediate wins and remain focused on talent collection and player development. The Sixers are not going to pass on a great player because he won’t immediately contribute, nor are they going to let a young centerpiece warm the bench because a veteran can get them closer to mediocre. And getting a better draft pick, giving them more chances of landing great players, is a byproduct of that.

But mediocrity itself isn’t a bad thing. As usual, context is key.

In fact, for most teams mediocrity a natural part of their life cycle, and something that legitimately shows progress. As recently drafted guys with franchise potential start to show their dominance, but aren’t yet experienced or developed enough to reach superstar status, and don’t yet have all the supporting pieces in place to be a great team, mediocrity is usually a legitimate and welcome part of the path to greatness.

As long as you believe that you have future greatness on your roster.

Where mediocre is bad, and where it should be avoided, is when it’s reached without the potential for greatness on the roster. When Jrue Holiday and Thaddeus Young are the best players on your roster, mediocre is bad. Neither Jrue Holiday nor Thaddeus Young will ever be dominant, and thus the goal is to get those dominant players. Being in the middle impedes that.

But the Sixers are not trying to skip the middle ground forever. On the 1-to-5 scale, levels 2 and 3 may very well come, and it’s not a bad thing. Having young players who can dominate the league and push a team to immediate contention is extremely rare. But being horrible while young players show legitimate signs of dominance is tough as well, as you’re seeing with the Sixers this year. Nearly every pundit thought the Sixers would be historically bad this year. But, due to a defense anchored by Nerlens Noel, they won’t even be the worst (or 2nd worst) team in the league this season, much less in NBA history.

If young players show legitimate signs of dominance, especially in the Eastern Conference, especially if the Sixers hit on not only Nerlens Noel but also Joel Embiid and their 2015 draft pick, mediocre is virtually unavoidable.

But the Sixers “skipping steps” or trying to “rush the process”, signing veterans and using up their cap space in an effort just to reach mediocre quicker, to appease the fan base and national pundits, is what they’re avoiding. Reaching the middle ground organically, through the development of their own players, is a natural step in the process.

Michael Carter-Williams, draft picks, and the fear of the unknown

By Derek Bodner | March 25, 2015 - 6:35 pm | Features

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“Medicine is a science of uncertainty and an art of probability.”

– William Osler

Those words were spoken by William Osler, one of the founders of Johns Hopkins Hospital and frequently described as the father of modern medicine.

Replace “Medicine” with “Basketball” and it sounds quite a bit like Sam Hinkie’s philosophy with the Philadelphia 76ers. There’s also a lot of truth to the statement, and certainly more than most people would like to admit.

One of the primary reactions to the Michael Carter-Williams trade, from fans and members of the media alike, has been one of incredulity: how could Sam Hinkie trade a known commodity for another unknown draft pick?

But what does that really mean?

In the discussions between those who are for and against the trade, or the debate about the merits of “The Plan” in general, there are two major points of contention in the above statement. The first point of contention is just how much Michael Carter-Williams is a known commodity.

Sure, Carter-Williams is fresh off of winning a Rookie of the Year award, an accomplishment that will stay on his resume for the rest of his career. But what does that really mean? What does that mean about his current level of play? What does that mean about his fit with Joel Embiid, or whoever they get with the 2015 draft pick?

Just how good is Michael Carter-Williams, currently? John Gonzalez argues that he’s not in the top 20 NBA point guards, and it’s not something I would argue against. His turnovers (only 1.5-to-1 assist-to-turnover ratio in the half-court) and his shooting (27% beyond three feet, only 36% overall in the half-court) are simply killers in today’s NBA.

ESPN took it a step further, polling 25 NBA personnel — including scouts and executives, coaches, and players — and did not list Michael Carter-Williams in their top 30.

Carter-Williams currently ranks 56th among all point guards in ESPN’s Real Plus-Minus. He ranks 149th in win shares among all guards who have played at least 500 minutes, 86th in Boxscore Plus-Minus, and 68th in Value Over Replacement Player. His true shooting percentage of 44.5% is the lowest of all players who have used as many possessions as he has.

Michael Carter-Williams League-Wide Rankings

Where Michael Carter-Williams' advanced stats place him among his peers.
(as of March 25th, 2015)

Stat	MCW	Rank	Context
RPM	-2.77	56th	All point guards
Win Shares	-0.5	149th	Guards with more than 500 minutes played
Boxscore Plus-Minus	-1.4	86th	Guards with more than 500 minutes played
Value Over Replacement Player	0.3	68th	Guards with more than 500 minutes played
True Shooting Percentage	45.2%	24th out of 24	All players with a usage rate > 26.8%

Those aren’t just bad numbers, they’re horrific.

As a team the Sixers offense was worse with Michael Carter-Williams on the floor. Significantly worse, actually. The team averaged 91.3 points per 100 possessions in the 1,392 minutes that Carter-Williams played for the Sixers this season against 96.8 points per 100 possessions in the 1,116 minutes that he was on the bench prior to being traded.

Sixers Offense Before/After Trade Deadline

Stat	Before Deadline	After Deadline
Points per 100 possessions	91.5	94.8
True Shooting %	49.4%	49.4%
3pt %	31%	34.7%
% of field goal attempts from 3	30%	34.7%
Assists per turnover	1.09	1.32
Turnovers per 100 possessions	18.9	16.4

Not exactly the trend you want to see in your floor general.

And it’s not just the numbers, either. Michael Carter-Williams’ struggles taking care of the ball and his shooting limitations were readily evident on film as well.

Clinging to the known, when the known isn’t good enough, is silly. Trading a below league-average player doesn’t set the rebuild back.

Really, in order to promote keeping Michael Carter-Williams over a potential top-7 pick what you’re doing is arguing for the chance that Michael Carter-Williams will improve. You’re hoping that Michael Carter-Williams will improve.

Chance. And Hope. Because it’s certainly far from a sure thing.

People love to bring up Jason Kidd, now Michael Carter-Williams’ coach and mentor, when talking about Carter-Williams. And Kidd certainly shows that the book isn’t closed when talking about Michael Carter-Williams’ future. Kidd is, however, an edge case, and he’s an edge case for the reason: shooting is far from a certainty to improve.

The Jason Kidd example signifies hope, not a known thing.

The truth is, certainty is an illusion. We are not certain that these picks the Sixers are collecting will ever work out, nor are we sure that the pick the Sixers traded for will ever be in the top 10.

But we are similarly not sure that Michael Carter-Williams will ever improve enough that you can realistically make him a significant contributor in your half-court offense. Just like were were similarly uncertain whether Andrew Bynum or Elton Brand could remain healthy and dominant. And, if recent history is any indication, it is very uncertain whether the Sixers will be able to attract a franchise cornerstone in free agency.

“How you think about uncertainty?,” Sam Hinkie asked members of the media after the deadline. “Do you think about uncertainty as it’s scary, and it’s something to be afraid of, or do you try to look at it and say ‘Where are there opportunities there that can make our team better?’

“It is possible for two things to be really valuable, both Michael and something else, and I believe that,” Hinkie concluded.

It’s possible that Michael Carter-Williams improves his jump shot like Jason Kidd, and It’s possible that Michael Carter-Williams can fit into a half-court offense centered around Joel Embiid. Just like it’s possible that the pick they traded Carter-Williams for can end up in the top-7 in the draft, and with that pick it’s possible that they can draft a difference maker.

The truth is, we don’t live in a world where possibility is all that relevant. It’s probability that reigns supreme.

As fans we are much more comfortable determining the probability of something that we’re familiar with. The more familiarity we have, the more comfortable we are in putting our faith in something that isn’t a sure thing.

In the end, the majority of Philadelphia fans don’t have a problem waiting for the team to be good. Many of the same people who are quick to cry that the Sixers are sacrificing wins this season are more than willing for the Eagles to trade the farm for Marcus Mariota in the draft, even if that means taking a step back during the next year or two. A wasted season is not wasted if it’s used to acquire, and develop, a guy who is capable of leading a franchise for the next decade. A franchise quarterback is that important to the sport.

And while a franchise quarterback is undoubtedly important, so is a dominant player in basketball. Except, in the NFL, with so many players to fit under a harder salary cap, building a dynasty is incredibly difficult. In the NBA, the opposite is true: restricted free agency, the soft salary cap, and the small roster size allows dynasties to be built. All you have to do is grab one or two young studs to kickstart the process.

But the public is much more comfortable projecting NFL quarterbacks than they are NCAA freshman guards, even if their effectiveness in projecting them isn’t all that high. NFL draft picks, even quarterbacks, perhaps especially quarterbacks, taken in the top 5 fail all the time, yet here we are ready to hand over our franchise to an unknown. Not because he is a certainty, but because we’re familiar with him.

Similarly, we’re more comfortable trading for Andrew Bynum or signing Elton Brand because we know them. We’re familiar with them, and that brings us comfort. But that doesn’t mean their future value is a known commodity, and certainly doesn’t suggest that they’re a sure thing, as we all found out.

Both fans and media members alike are far better at measuring past value than we are at predicting future success, and we frequently conflate knowing what a player has done with knowing what a player will do.

We’ve spent far more time watching Michael Carter-Williams over the last few years than we have been watching D’Angelo Russell, and certainly more than we have spent watching Mario Hezonja. Because of that, Michael Carter-Williams represents a known commodity in the eyes of some, even if the improvement he’ll be required to make in order to become as productive as we want is far from a sure thing.

But because it’s unknown to you doesn’t make it more inherently risky, and shouldn’t drive Sam Hinkie’s decisions. He’s watched a lot more tape than you, both in terms of college and international prospects. He’s run the studies on the likelihood of first round picks working out. He knows the history. What we are uncomfortable projecting, he builds his job around.

Just because you are more familiar with Michael Carter-Williams does not mean he has a better chance of becoming great.

But that is what this trade is about. Sam Hinkie didn’t trade Michael Carter-Williams because he’s looking to restart the rebuild. He didn’t move on from Carter-Williams to delay when he’s held accountable, because he wants to lose, or because he fetishizes over the unknown rather than the known.

He traded Michael Carter-Williams because what he views as probable – from the probability of Carter-Williams improving to the probability of landing a star talent at the top of the draft – is different than what you view as probable.

Because, truth is, both paths were far from known.

The Sixers Are Building Through The Draft, Not Tanking, And It Really Isn’t Revolutionary

By Derek Bodner | March 10, 2015 - 10:42 pm | Features

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A common criticism of Sam Hinkie’s plan to rebuild the Philadelphia 76ers is that tanking hasn’t worked.

The first, and most natural, defense against that is to point out the number of good teams in the league who have tanked. So you respond that the Warriors tanked hard in 2011-12 to keep their draft pick, which they would have lost if it fell out of the top 7 of the draft.

Well, yeah. But what about championships?

You could go all the way back to the 80’s, when the Houston Rockets and the Chicago Bulls tanked hard in a race to the top of the 1984 draft, tanking so egregious that it caused the NBA to institute a lottery to try to prevent repeat efforts in the future. My memory is hazy, but Chicago and Houston had some level of success to show for their efforts.

You could go for a more recent example and dissect San Antonio’s motives after David Robinson went down . I know it was short-lived, but Tim Duncan and the Spurs did have some moderate success as well.

Another relatively recent example, even if slightly more unconventional, was Boston during the Greg Oden draft. Boston tanked hard enough that their own players openly questioned the team’s motives. Not only were the motives of the front office questioned, but players were openly questioning whether Doc Rivers’ rotations were based upon a desire to lose.

Their efforts didn’t result in Greg Oden, but the 5^th picked that their losses did net them was eventually flipped for Ray Allen, which then caused Kevin Garnett to reconsider his willingness to go to Boston. They then immediately won a championship as a direct result of their intentional losing.

Okay, okay, but what about a multi-year tank? Where’s the evidence that will work?

Oklahoma City is the obvious response to that. The Sonics, as they were known at the time, had an aging, mediocre, expensive team in desperate need of a rebuild. They shipped off aging Ray Allen and jettisoned overpriced Rashard Lewis and kicked off an era where they didn’t care about wins and losses, but rather focused on talent acquisition and player development. This strategy continued even after they drafted franchise cornerstone Kevin Durant, and over a 3 year period they drafted not only Durant but Russell Westbrook, James Harden, and Serge Ibaka as well.

Perhaps more egregious, or ingenious, depending on your point of view, was how they constructed their roster while developing their young talent. The Thunder intentionally avoided loading up the roster with either veterans who could teach these franchise cornerstones the lay of the land, and also help them compete in the short term, but in return take away valuable minutes from the developing Durant and Westbrook.

During Russell Westbrook’s rookie season, the Thunder’s top 3 players, in terms of minutes played, were under 22 years of age, and 5 of their top 7 were 25 years of age or less. They went a combined 43-121 during Durant’s first two seasons,

Russell Westbrook was put in an impossibly tough role out of the gate, and he struggled as a result. He shot only 39% from the field and led the league in turnovers during his rookie season and the Thunder, despite Kevin Durant averaging 25 points per night and already emerging as one of the best scorers in the league, struggled to turn that individual talent into a competitive basketball team.

But their young studs got time and, despite consistently losing, that playing time and experience escalated their development from raw basketball talent to NBA winners.

Okay, fine. But not only has Oklahoma City failed to win a championship, you say, but they’re also the edge case, the ray of light in an otherwise dim collection of teams who never climb out of the NBA’s basement. Even if you want to discount the 14 combined championships that were a direct result of tanking that I listed above and say they’re not applicable because they weren’t cast in the exact same mold as the Sixers approach, there are a couple of problems with using the lack of championships created through the efforts of multi-year tanking to prove that tanking doesn’t work.

First, it’s impossible to determine who “tanked” for multiple years due to a planned strategy and those who did it through organizational incompetence. That distinction is key. Any plan, regardless of the path, will fail if continually poor decisions are made. And we simply do not have enough data to truly determine whether Sam Hinkie is a good decision maker or not. We have hints, but we’re years away from knowing for sure. So saying that a plan is doomed because Hinkie will make the wrong decisions is not a perspective unique to tanking, but one doubters would be saying regardless of his strategy.

The second problem is that, when you take those who remained at the top of the lottery through incompetence out of the equation, the sample size of teams actually trying to remain at the top of the draft to build the foundation of their team is incredibly small. So yes, there may not have been a champion built the way that Sam Hinkie is building the Sixers, but that more speaks to the unique opportunity and leeway that Hinkie has more than it does the soundness of the plan.

And focusing on “tanking” really muddles up what we’re actually talking about, which is that the Sixers believe building through the draft is necessary. Tanking is simply an effort to maximize the chances of moving on from this stage by hitting big in the draft.

And, if you look at all of the great teams in the league, they all got their start towards relevance in the draft. In order to get a top-20 player through trade or free agency, you need to already have a top-20 player on your roster to make yourself a destination. The NBA has gone through great lengths to make simply having cap space not enough to acquire your first foundational piece. Due to restricted free agency, the soft salary cap, and limiting maximum contracts, superstars coming off of their rookie contracts and entering their prime do not leave to go to teams that don’t have a superstar already in place.

The money the Sixers can offer a superstar is not unique, and the destination the Sixers can offer is simply not good enough. In order to become an attractive destination, the Sixers need money and a great, home-grown player.

Team	Record	1st "great" player	Date Acquired	How
Golden State	50-12	Stephen Curry	2009 Draft	Drafted 7th
Atlanta	50-13	Al Horford	2007 Draft	Drafted 3rd
Memphis	45-18	Mike Conley	2007 Draft	Drafted 4th
Houston	43-20	James Harden	Oct 2012	Trade
Portland	41-20	LaMarcus Aldridge	2006 Draft	Drafted 2nd
L.A. Clippers	41-23	Blake Griffin	2009 Draft	Drafted 1st
Dallas	41-24	Dirk Nowitzki*	1998 Draft	Drafted 9th
San Antonio	39-23	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
Cleveland	40-25	Kyrie Irving	2011 Draft	Drafted 1st
Chicago	39-26	Derrick Rose	2008 Draft	Drafted 1st

(If you want, you can add the Thunder to this list, as they’d usually be among the best teams in the league if they were even marginally healthy. They got their start by drafting Kevin Durant 2^nd overall in 2007).

This isn’t necessarily a list of the team’s best players, but the first great player that they obtained, the player that then made them a relevant destination that established stars would be willing to join.

That’s also not to say that hitting in the draft is all that’s needed to build a contender, or that the entire team can and will be built through the draft. In each case, there was more work to be done, whether that be hitting on more draft picks (OKC, Golden State, San Antonio, Chicago Bulls), free agency signings (Atlanta, Houston), trades (Memphis, Clippers), or, more often than not, some combination of all of the above. It just means that the first step, largely due to league rules, more often than not happens in the draft.

If you want, you can go through and look at the last 10 NBA champions and notice a similar trend:

Year	Team	1st "great" player	Date Acquired	How
2014	Spurs	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
2013	Heat	Dwyane Wade	2003 Draft	Drafted 5th
2012	Heat	Dwyane Wade	2003 Draft	Drafted 5th
2011	Mavs	Dirk Nowitzki*	1998 Draft	Drafted 9th
2010	Lakers	Kobe Bryant	1996 Draft	Draft Night Trade (13th pick)
2009	Lakers	Kobe Bryant	2009 Draft	Draft Night Trade (13th pick)
2008	Celtics	Paul Pierce	1998 Draft	Drafted 10th
2007	Spurs	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
2006	Heat	Dwyane Wade	2003 Draft	Drafted 5th
2005	Spurs	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st

Or, take a look at the last 10 teams to win 55+ games:

Year	Team	Record	1st "great" player	Date Acquired	How
2013-14	Spurs	62-20	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
2013-14	Thunder	59-23	Kevin Durant	2007 Draft	Drafted 2nd
2012-13	Heat	66-16	Dwyane Wade	2003 Draft	Drafted 5th
2012-13	Thunder	60-22	Kevin Durant	2007 Draft	Drafted 2nd
2012-13	Spurs	58-24	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
2010-11	Bulls	62-20	Derrick Rose	2008 Draft	Drafted 1st
2010-11	Spurs	61-21	Tim Duncan	1997 Draft	Drafted 1st
2010-11	Heat	58-24	Dwyane Wade	2003 Draft	Drafted 5th
2009-10	Cavs	61-21	LeBron James	2003 Draft	Drafted 1st
2009-10	Magic	59-23	Dwight Howard	2004 Draft	Drafted 1st

*Note: Dirk Nowitzki was acquired in a draft day trade, but the Mavs traded their #6 overall pick for the #9 overall pick, which they used to select Nowitzki

Once you really start to look into it, the question quickly shifts from “Can tanking work?” to “Is hitting a home run in the draft necessary?” And the answer is pretty clear: If you want to become relevant in the NBA, the first step is almost universally to acquire a great player in the draft.

Once you arrive at that conclusion, what Sam Hinkie and the Sixers are doing makes sense. And once you buy into how necessary the draft is to kickstart a legitimate rebuild, maximizing the chances that you’ll hit in the draft is the next logical step.

Sure, it’s not necessary to be at the top of the draft in order to get a superstar, but having your selection of as many prospects as possible is inherently advantageous. If you believe in your ability to scout, if you believe in your ability to find talent in the draft, then you want to limit the role that luck plays in the equation. The way you limit luck is to draft as close to the top as possible, so you’re not left in the situation where you’ve successfully identified the best player, the one player who could truly turn a franchise around, only to have him be picked before you have a chance to select him yourself. Sure, he *might* fall down to you in the draft, but *might* is less than optimal. Drafting at the top presents decision makers with a better opportunity, and better odds of success.

And perhaps a multi-year tank isn’t necessary, and the first player that you draft will turn out to be a (healthy) superstar. But, by acknowledging the inherently uncertain nature of the NBA draft, while not changing how much of a necessity success in the draft is, limiting the risk of any one selection by having numerous high-quality selections makes sense. Best not to put all of your eggs in one basket. Risk diversification.

And the reward is huge. The NBA has crafted their free agency rules not just to make it easier for teams to retain their drafted stars long term, but also to make it easier to have the resources to add complementary talent around them. Hit big in the draft and the NBA has a system set up where the rich get richer.

That’s why what Sam Hinkie and the Sixers are doing isn’t really revolutionary, but evolutionary. Great teams have always been built through the draft, Hinkie has just recognized this, cut out the pretense, and put the Sixers in a position to maximize the chances that they land the player in the draft that history has shown that they need, then give that player(s) the immensely valuable experience and playing time necessary to reach their potential.

It may work. It may not. The ascent from also-ran to title contender is fraught with land mines in the way, regardless of the method Sam Hinkie goes about rebuilding the team. Even smart decisions are going require equal amounts of luck and opportunity mixed in to reach their, and our, ultimate goal.

Because of how difficult it is to catapult to the top of the NBA’s pecking order, some will view the Sixers plan as an unnecessary risk. If the reward isn’t likely, the price becomes unbearable. However, many of the same rules that make it difficult for teams to enter the NBA’s elite also make it possible to build a dynasty.

Do it right, hit at the top of the draft, and make smart decisions after that, and the NBA gives you every opportunity possible to remain at the top.

That’s why when Sam Hinkie talks about wanting to build something truly special, he’s not kidding. The NBA allows special. This is not the NFL, where every year mediocre teams rise to the top, and great times fall back to the pack. Special is possible in the NBA. It just usually comes on the heels of forgettable.

This is not about morals or ethics. Sam Hinkie is not trying to revolutionize the game, prove that he’s the smartest man in the room, or extend his employment by making it impossible to gauge his progress. Nobody wants colossal failure on the first line of their resume. This is about the draft, about recognizing its importance in this phase of team building, and providing the best opportunity to hit in the draft by increasing both the quantity, and quality, of draft picks at his disposal.

It might not work, but if it does …

2015 Trade Deadline Predictions

By Derek Bodner | February 19, 2015 - 9:02 am | Features

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As we sit here 6 hours before the trade deadline, this are my Sixers predictions for the 2015 NBA trade deadline.

*Note*: These are predictions, not based off of inside information. If I have inside information, I’ll report it as such in a separate post.

Andrei Kirilenko: I don’t think Kirilenko is dealt, because I don’t think there’s really much of a demand for a guy who hasn’t been playing, and who everybody knows will be cut / bought out soon anyway. It wouldn’t surprise me to see him cut or bought out shortly after the deadline, though.

Jason Richardson: Jason Richardson practicing 5-on-5 is great, but I don’t think it means he has value around the league. It’s great that Richardson is practicing, and I hope he’s able to prove he’s healthy in the next few months so he can audition for his next contract, but I think he’ll be in a 76ers uniform come Friday.

Michael Carter-Williams: I think the Sixers are likely fielding calls about MCW, but I don’t think Sam Hinkie is going to find a taker at his asking price.

Nerlens Noel: Again, Hinkie might listen, but a team would have to absolutely blow Sam Hinkie away with an offer. Everything I’ve heard has been speculation from reporters on a deal that “might make sense.” It’s going to take far more than Nik Stauskas to pry Noel away from Hinkie, in my opinion.

Luc Mbah a Moute: Think there would be interest in him around the league, and could see a team giving up a second round pick for the versatile defender, but my gut tells me he stays.

Robert Covington: No (RE: <1%) chance.

Most likely to be traded: My guess would be Henry Sims.

Biggest asset likely to be moved: The Sixers cap space / flexibility

Prediction: Sixers end up with 2 more second round picks, but no major moves happen.

The Sixers Rebuilding Plan – Summary

By Derek Bodner | February 18, 2015 - 7:52 pm | Features

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I would be curious how many NBA fans would legitimately take Option A over Option B when trying to build the foundations of an NBA contender.

Summary:
Option A:
Jrue Holiday
12th pick in 2015 draft
2015 2nd rd pick
2016 2nd rd pick
(No 2014 1st round pick, no extra 2014 1st round pick, no 2017 1st round pick)

Option B:
Nerlens Noel
Joel Embiid
Dario Saric
D’Angelo Russell (relatively realistic hypothetical)
2017 1st rd pick
(No 2015 2nd rd pick or 2016 2nd rd pick)

Dario Saric’s Contract Situation

By Derek Bodner | September 3, 2014 - 9:00 am | Features, Sixers

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Just days before the 2014 NBA Draft, Chad Ford reported that Dario Saric had signed a three-year contract with Turkish club Anadolu Efes, where he will join former NBA players such as Zoran Planinic and Nenad Krstic.

The contract, while for a total of three years, includes an out after two years (frequently cited as a “2+1″ contract), should Saric wish to come over to the NBA then. Saric did say (in very broken English) at both Media Day and on Draft night that he would come over after 2 seasons.

“I will come to the NBA for sure, 100 percent in two years and that’s all.” — Dario Saric

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How the Sixers did — and didn’t — turn a profit last year

By Derek Bodner | August 28, 2014 - 9:00 am | Features, Sixers

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It has been known for quite some time now that the Sixers, despite finishing the season 29th out of 30 NBA teams in attendance, turned a profit last year.

This has led some to speculate that they did so by gaming the system by just barely meeting the league’s minimum salary requirements, then turning a profit on the backs of the league’s revenue sharing program.

Last year the NBA was projected to redistribute over $231 million to its needy teams through their revenue sharing program, a huge jump from the $40 million or so that was distributed under the previous CBA, which came entirely from luxury tax payments. Two teams were scheduled to receive in excess of $20 million each to help them remain competitive financially, with an additional 5 teams scheduled to receive $17 million each.

Except, the Sixers weren’t one of these 7 teams. In fact, the Sixers are not eligible to receive one cent from the league’s revenue sharing program, a fact first reported by Zach Lowe of Grantland, and one that John Gonzalez followed up on.

The exact details of who is eligible for revenue sharing are clarified by Larry Coon, where he states that teams with more than 2.5 million TV households cannot receive a revenue sharing payment.

This list, according to the Nielsen group, would include teams in the New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Dallas, and San Francisco media markets.

Beyond that, since teams contribute to the revenue sharing pool an amount equal to a percentage of their revenue, the league actually makes teams accountable for hitting revenue benchmarks based on market size. If a team falls short on revenue they have to make up that difference. While I don’t have the exact figures of the Sixers revenue sharing contribution, it stands to reason that the Sixers didn’t hit their revenue benchmarks, and thus ended up sending a higher percentage of their revenue towards the league’s revenue sharing program than they normally would have, while getting nothing back from it.

In short, the Sixers did not turn a profit based on the league’s revenue sharing program.

(Note: All teams do, however, receive roughly $31 million per season as part of the league’s national television deal, which is an 8 year, $7.5 billion deal between the NBA and ESPN/Turner that expires after the 2015-16 NBA season. The national TV deal is separate from the revenue sharing program, and all teams, regardless of market size, receive a portion of this. The value of the next national TV deal could increase substantially.)

Salary cap floor

The salary cap floor is a topic that comes up frequently in Sixersland.

The league mandates that each team must spend 90% of the salary cap towards player salaries. With a salary cap set at $63.065 million for the 2014-15 season, that means a team must pay at least $56.759 million in team salary for the season.

With the Sixers currently at just around $32 million in committed salary, that sounds like a potential issue.

Except it’s really not. The “penalty” for not hitting the salary floor is virtually non-existent, as the Sixers would just have to distribute the amount they’re under the floor to the players on roster. So, should the Sixers be $20 million under the floor at the end of the season, the players on roster will get a significant bonus.

The goal of the floor, and of the penalty, is that teams will essentially pay a fixed minimum amount to players, even if team salary falls below there.

But there is a loophole.

First, the teams salary is calculated at the end of the season. The team being below the salary cap floor at any point before then is irrelevant.

Second, team salaries are calculated based off of the full season salary of all players on the roster at the end of the season, even if that player was acquired during the season.

So, let’s say the Sixers acquire, oh, I don’t know, Danny Granger and his $13 million salary at the NBA’s trade deadline, and that salary brings them over the salary cap floor. Granger’s impact on team salary would be $13 million, even though the amount that they have to pay him is based on the amount of time he’s with the team (or, in this case, amount of games after he was waived), or roughly 1/3 of the season. So Granger’s cap hit would be $13 million, but the Sixers would only be on the hook to pay for roughly $4.3 million of that.

In theory, this discrepancy between how much Granger counted towards the Sixers end-of-year salary calculation and how much the team actually paid him could be considered a loophole to save money, although with how many lawyers looked over the NBA’s CBA, it’s hard for me to believe that this wasn’t a scenario they predicted would happen, and something that was intentional and accounted for.

Still, the longer the team goes into the season with upwards of $24 million between them and the salary floor, the potential cost savings grow. With the offseason virtually wrapped up there doesn’t seem like there will be all that many opportunities to add gobs of salary until the trade deadline, where a situation could present itself where a roughly $8 million expenditure could prevent the team from spending $24 million in salary floor penalty.

Now, is turning a profit why the Sixers aren’t using their salary cap space? I’m not sure I believe that. I think Sam Hinkie values salary cap flexibility immensely. I think that he wants to keep himself in a position where he can pounce on an opportunity if one presents itself, and the deals that have been presented to the Sixers thus far have simply not been worth giving up that flexibility for, in his mind. I think that this inability to find many opportunities has largely been influenced by the rising salary cap (which increased by over $4.3 million this summer) along with teams decreasing willingness to part with quality first round picks.

I also think that Sam Hinkie is not likely to make moves that add long term salary yet, thus limiting the amount of moves that he could make with that cap space. I think the Sixers brass realizes that, as the team is not yet a destination, luring players is going to be a difficult proposition. Using that cap space on stars is not feasible, and in order to use it to acquire complementary pieces they’re likely going to have to considerably overpay for their services. And they don’t want to start that process until they know what superstars those players are going to be complementing.

So, I think that at this point the salary cap flexibility is going to be largely kept in Sam Hinkie’s back pocket, used to facilitate deals by taking on short term contracts, while gaining relatively small assets in return.

Now, if the team is sitting at the trade deadline and no opportunity to acquire assets has presented itself, might they then look to take on enough salary to reach the salary cap floor rather than pay out the difference to their players, thus spending, in essence, $8 million rather than $24 million? This is when I believe the salary cap floor becomes relevant. But I do believe the Sixers lack of moves at this point in the offseason is because an opportunity hasn’t presented itself that is good enough to lose cap flexibility, rather than a desire to maximize their savings potential by using this loophole in the salary cap floor and team salary calculations.

(If you’re interested in the parts of the CBA that make this possible, I took a look at that here).

The signing of Joel Embiid

Earlier this week, Joel Embiid announced that he had signed his rookie contract.

My initial reaction was one of surprise, as it came almost a full month earlier than when Michael Carter-Williams and Nerlens Noel signed during last years offseason.

Why the surprise? It has to do with the salary cap.

For 1st round draft picks, the NBA has a set rookie scale, which basically slots what an incoming rookie can earn during his rookie contract based on where he was drafted. Teams and players have a little wiggle room — 20% above or below the rookie scale — but, in practice, virtually every 1st round draft pick signs for 120% of the rookie scale. For the 3rd overall pick in the 2014 NBA Draft, the NBA has slotted a first year salary of $3,689,700.

However, before a rookie signs his contract the amount he counts against a teams salary cap is 100% of the rookie scale contract. So, before signing a contract, Joel Embiid would count $3,689,700 against the Sixers salary cap. After signing the contract, assuming the Sixers gave Embiid the customary 120% of the rookie scale, his cap hit would rise to $4,427,640.

In essence, the Sixers gain an additional $734k in salary cap space by delaying the signing of Joel Embiid.

Now, the Sixers have roughly $30 million in salary cap space, so adding another $734k might seem inconsequential. And it most likely will turn out to be so. But, for a general manager like Sam Hinkie to give up *any* flexibility, even if there’s almost no chance of it being used, without getting anything in return, came as a surprise.

And there really isn’t anything to be gained by signing Embiid now vs signing him in late September. NBA players do not begin receiving pay checks until November 15th, so it’s not costing Embiid anything at the moment. It’s not that Sam Hinkie used up $734k of the Sixers cap space that surprised me, it’s that he did it when there was no real reason to do so.

It turns out, my initial suspicions were correct.

Bob Cooney wrote that the team isn’t ready to announce Embiid’s signing yet, and a source confirmed to me that the Sixers have yet to put their name on the dotted line. The contract will not be filed with the league (and, thus, not increase the Sixers salary cap commitment) until both parties have signed.

The reason the contract is not yet official? Likely that previously mentioned $734k in additional cap space. I would guess that the contract becomes official about a week before training camp starts up, or right around the same time that Michael Carter-Williams and Nerlens Noel signed last offseason. To this point, Embiid is the only top 10 pick that has not yet officially signed, but don’t be alarmed: I would expect this to be a standard practice any year where Sam Hinkie has salary cap space.

The confusing Hasheem Thabeet acquisition

A few hours after Sam Hinkie held the conference call to discuss the Thaddeus Young trade, the Sixers GM made another bold move: acquiring former 2nd overall pick Hasheem Thabeet.

Okay, there was a little bit of hyperbole there. It really wasn’t bold. Or even really an acquisition.

The Sixers traded a top-55 protected 2nd round pick to the Oklahoma City Thunder for Thabeet on Tuesday, although they will reportedly release Thabeet once the trade becomes official.

Why?

Hasheem Thabeet signed a 3 year, $3.65 million contract with the Thunder in July of 2012, with $2.4 million in guaranteed salary. Thabeet earned $1.2 million in each of the previous 2 seasons, leaving his entire 2014-15 salary non-guaranteed, as long as he is released by September 1st.

So, Thabeet will cost the Sixers nothing.

But Oklahoma City could have also released him, leaving them with the same $0 hit on their salary cap. So why trade him to the Sixers so they could release him instead?

A traded player exception.

By trading Thabeet’s $1.25 million salary to the Sixers, while getting back $0 of salary in return, the over-the-cap Thunder got a free $1.25 million traded player exception for a player they were going to cut anyway. For the Sixers? They received $100k in cash for a player who will count $0 towards their salary cap.

All the other moving parts are moot. The Sixers will never actually give up the 2nd round pick in the deal, which would require them to finish with one of the 5 best records in the league this year. They just had to “send something back” in order for the trade to work under the CBA. Hasheem Thabeet’s salary is fully non-guaranteed, and he will never receive one cent from the Sixers, and will not count at all against their cap. It has absolutely nothing to do with reaching the salary cap floor.

This trade was, essentially, about the Thunder buying a $1.25 million trade exception for $100k.

Sixers to get Anthony Bennett? A look at the former #1 overall pick

By Derek Bodner | August 5, 2014 - 10:00 am | Features, NBA, Sixers

9 Comments

Yesterday afternoon, Brian Windhorst was on ESPN Radio in New York saying that the Kevin Love to Cleveland trade is agreed upon in principle, with the huge caveat that something could happen sometime between now and August 23rd, when it can finally become official. Still, the news that the two sides have seemingly come to an agreement on compensation for Love was big news.

Windhorst then went on to speculate about the Sixers involvement in the trade. It’s worth listening to the audio (linked above, starting at around the 9:45 mark), but it seemed as if Windhorst’s tone shifted from reporting fact (Cleveland & Minnesota have an agreement in principle) to speculation when talking about the Sixers. Sean O’Connor over at LibertyBallers did a good job of transcribing the audio.

“But before the papers have been signed, there’s this handshake agreement that: Kevin Love to the Cavs, Andrew Wiggins to the Timberwolves, and I believe Thaddeus Young will end up in Minnesota, either as part of a separate deal or as part of a three-way deal, possibly Anthony Bennett who’s on the Cavs right now could get re-routed to Philadelphia in part of a deal for Thaddeus Young. There will be draft picks involved, but essentially what you need to know if you’re an NBA fan: Kevin Love will end up in Cleveland barring anything unforeseen, and Andrew Wiggins will end up in Minnesota.”

— Brian Windhorst, ESPN Radio New York

As mentioned, “I believe” and “possibly” are two words that make it seem like he’s less certain on Philadelphia’s involvement then he is on the Cleveland/Minnesota portion being agreed upon.

It’s also worth noting, that while many are reporting that the Sixers could get a draft pick back in the trade, and while that’s certainly a possibility, Windhorst doesn’t specifically say that there will be a pick coming back to Philadelphia, just that picks will be involved in the trade. Still, for a breakdown of potential picks that the Sixers could receive, check out the article I wrote last week on the subject.

Still, despite the fact that the Sixers portion of it came off as speculation, with how connected Windhorst is to the deal, combined with Marc Stein’s report last week that the Wolves are specifically targeting Thaddeus Young, along with the report that the Sixers would have accepted Anthony Bennett in the Jrue Holiday/Nerlens Noel trade last summer, Windhorst’s report that the Sixers could end up with Anthony Bennett is certainly newsworthy, and worth a closer look.

(Note: Last fall I was part of a group that sat down with Sam Hinkie for an extended Q&A session over breakfast, and he addressed the rumors that they would have taken Bennett in the trade. His response was that he never would have said that, because revealing a draft board is “the shortest of the short games,” specifically because players become available later in their careers. Interesting that now, just 10 months after that breakfast, he’s on the verge of acquiring one of those rumored players).

Why the wait?

We’re in this holding period because Cleveland signed Andrew Wiggins to a contract on July 24th. Because of this, Cleveland has to wait at least 30 days before Andrew Wiggins can be included in a trade.

Why would they sign Andrew Wiggins and delay the completion of the trade, when it has seemed like this was inevitable since the time they signed LeBron? The answer could be for salary matching purposes. Kevin Love is set to earn $15.7 million this upcoming season, and because Cleveland is now over the cap, they have to get close to sending out that much salary in return. Before Wiggins signed his contract, his outbound salary counted as $0 in trade calculations. Now that he has signed his contract, when he is traded he will count at (a presumed) $5.5 million in the trade. If the Cavaliers made this trade before signing Wiggins, they would have had to have found another player(s) to add to make up that difference.

Why are the Sixers involved?

One thing to make clear, it is not necessary for the Sixers to be involved in this trade. Non-taxpaying teams (which the Cavs are) only have to get their outbound salary within $5 million of what they are receiving (on trades where their outgoing salary totals between $9.8 million and $19.6 million). Wiggins’ and Bennett’s salaries total roughly $11.09 million, which falls into this range is within $5 million of Kevin Love’s salary ($16.07 million).

That being said, the Sixers could be involved for either of two reasons.

One reason is that either the Wolves of the Cavs could look to dump an unwanted contract on the Sixers, such as Kevin Martin (3 years, $21 million remaining). The purpose of the Sixers would mainly be to take back salary on a player who would be an unnecessary luxury on a rebuilding team like the Wolves. However, reports are starting to suggest that Flip Saunders and Minnesota may want Martin around for the rebuild. If so, the necessity to include the Sixers as a 3rd team lessens dramatically.

Even without that, the Sixers are being linked to the trade because of Minnesota’s specific interest in acquiring Thaddeus Young. No longer are the Sixers mentioned as a suitor just because they have cap space, but because they have a specific asset that Minnesota is looking for.

Now, why Minnesota would be targeting Young I’m not so sure. From a basketball standpoint, it makes perfect sense, as Young is only 25 years old and is an incredibly valuable basketball player, and one who should still be valuable 3-4 years down the line when the Wolves (hopefully) are through the hard part of their rebuild and regaining relevancy. However, with the reports that Young has been displeased with the Sixers rebuild, I can’t envision him being happy going through the same process in Minnesota. Since Young possesses an early termination option after this season, it seems odd that Minnesota is specifically targeting a one year rental.

Anthony Bennett the draft prospect

When looking at Anthony Bennett, it’s hard to really get a gauge on his value. On the one hand, he’s barely over 13 months removed from being the top pick in the draft. On the other hand, he just came off arguably the worst rookie season for a #1 overall pick in the modern era.

While Bennett going #1 was a surprise to me, I still had him rated at #4 on my own personal draft board heading into the draft.

Measurables:

As Bennett was nursing a shoulder injury, he did not participate at the 2013 NBA combine, so the last public measurement we have for him is the 2012 Nike Hoop Summit. He measured 6’7″ in shoes there, weighing 239 pounds and with a 7’1″ wingspan. He is listed at 6’8″ and 259 lbs on his nba.com player profile.

While at 6”7″ in shoes, Bennett would certainly be undersized, his 7’1″ wingspan would be slightly above average for a power forward, and also above average for a player of his size. Unfortunately, for a post player the measurement I’m more interested in is standing reach, and because of his injury last year we don’t have good data on that. That being said, I would classify him as an undersized power forward, but one with long enough arms to help him overcome that.

Stats at UNLV

A quick look at some stats from while Bennett was at UNLV.

Year	GP	MPG	PPG	RPG	APG	SPG	BPG
Out of Conference	19	29.4	19.5	8.9	1.2	0.8	1.3
In Conference	16	24.4	12.1	7.2	0.7	0.5	1.1
2012-13 UNLV (all)	35	27.1	16.1	8.1	1.0	0.7	1.2

Year	ORtg	DRtg	USG%	PER	Win Shares	WS/40	OWS	DWS
2012-13 UNLV (conference)	99.6	90.2	26.9%	20.4	1.4	0.146	0.5	0.9
2012-13 UNLV (all)	117.6	89.3	27.5%	28.3	5.7	0.240	3.5	2.3

Year	OReb%	DReb%	blk%	stl%	ft rate	2pt%	3pta-3ptm	3pt%
2012-13 UNLV (conference)	10.7%	20.8%	4.7%	1.2%	?	53%	13-37	35.1%
2012-13 UNLV (all)	10.3%	21.8%	4.6%	1.5%	46.7%	58.7%	36-96	37.5%

The immediate takeaway is: man, did Anthony Bennett feast on a relatively weak non-conference schedule, which according to Kenpom.com was ranked 180th toughest in the country, including teams such as Chicago St (ranked 287th per Kenpom, where Bennett scored 22 points on 7-11 shooting), Cal St. Bakersfield (ranked 241st, 28 points on 10-13 shooting), Northern Arizona (ranked 294th, 22 points on 9-13 shooting), Jacksonville St (ranked 206th, 12 points on 3-6 shooting), Hawaii (ranked 213th, 16 points on 6-12 shooting), and Portland (ranked 262nd, 18 points on 6-11 shooting).

All teams have cupcakes on their schedule, of course. But the combination of UNLV’s relatively weak out of conference schedule and his pretty big in conference / out of conference splits inflated Bennett’s overall stats just a bit.

Still, Bennett’s in-conference play (against a relatively strong Mountain West Conference) provided quite a bit of optimism, averaging 12.1 points, 7.2 rebounds in only 24 minutes per game, yielding a 20.4 PER and 0.146 win shares per 40 minutes (remember, WS/40 is used in college, whereas if you’re used to the NBA stat, it’s WS/48. Adjust accordingly). He had the highest PER (28.3) of any freshman player drafted that season (second highest was Nerlens Noel at 27.3).

Skills shown at UNLV

What made Bennett so intriguing of a prospect was high combination of strength, athleticism, and versatile offensive game, which, combined with his good length, allowed him to overcome his short height.

Bennett got a high percentage of offense in the post, where his strength, footwork, and ability to make moves over either shoulder made him a real threat, and was a solid projectable skill for him at the next level. Combining that with his accurate outside shot (37.5% from three on nearly 3 attempts per game), which included being able to hit shots off the dribble at an extremely impressive rate considering his size, and he was a tough cover. All of this then opened up a dribble drive game where he once again showcased that surprising athleticism and how comfortable he was handling the basketball with either hand, and he had an incredibly diverse skill set for a big man. For as much as the NBA has become about the stretch power forward, Bennett could theoretically fill that role, while still providing a considerable threat scoring in the paint off of legitimate post-up skills, dribble drives, and offensive rebounds. He brought potentially the best of both worlds.

His biggest pitfall, besides potential weight concerns, was on the defensive side of the court. A glass-half-full kind of person would say “his effort level was inconsistent.” I’m not sure I’d agree with that. His effort level was fairly consistent, it was just consistently bad. From effort, to positioning, to stance and technique, Bennett could best be described as a disinterested defender. He can hopefully be hidden somewhat next to Nerlens Noel and (eventually) Joel Embiid, but Brett Brown will have his hands full trying to get him to contribute (outside of rebounding, which he’s very good at) on this side of the court.

For more information, go check out our DraftExpress scouting report from before the draft.

His rookie season

Then came his rookie season. Again, a glass-half-full type would call it a struggle. A glass-half-empty type would call it possibly the worst rookie season for a #1 overall pick in 30+ years.

Last year for the Cavs, Bennett 4.2 points per in just over 12.8 minutes per game, shooting 35.6% from the field. He generate -0.4 win shares on the season (-0.028/48), including -1.1 offensive win shares, with a true shooting percentage of 42.5% and a PER of 6.9.

No #1 overall pick has done worse in ANY of win shares, offensive win shares, PER, or true shooting percentage. Here are some of the closest “competitors” to Anthony Bennett’s rookie season:

Player	Season	Minutes	PER	Win Shares	Offensive Win Shares	TS%
Anthony Bennett	2013-14	663	6.9	-0.4	-1.1	42.5%
Kwame Brown	2001-02	817	11.2	0.8	0.0	45.0%
Kenyon Martin	2000-01	2272	13.4	2.1	-0.4	47.2%
Michael Olowokandi	1998-99	1279	11.8	-0.3	-0.8	44.5%
Pervis Ellison	1989-90	866	10.3	0.4	-0.5	47.5%
Danny Manning	1988-89	950	13.4	0.7	0.0	53.8%
Mark Aguirre	1981-82	1468	17.3	1.9	1.0	51.4%

The outliers on this list of Kenyon Martin and Danny Manning, who went on to have strong careers, although with Martin’s value being based off of his defense (a clear weakness of Bennett’s) and with Manning being far more of a perimeter player, drawing any parallel with these two would be difficult. And none of these seasons really even approached Bennett’s level of ineptitude in any of the aforementioned stats.

To be fair, Bennett did show signs of life at the end of the season, averaging 7.2 points and 4.8 rebounds on a 51.9% true shooting percentage in February, before missing quite a bit of time at the end of the season with a left patellar tendon strain. But, by all accounts his rookie season was an abject failure.

Why?

The why is, of course, as important as the what in this instance, mostly out of the hope that it could be corrected. Injuries and conditioning played a very big role in his disappointing rookie season, with his conditioning sapping him of his quickness and explosiveness, two staples of his game.

Right before the draft, DraftExpress was reporting that his conditioning had seemingly sent his stock into a tailspin. Well, one out of two isn’t bad. His stock, obviously, couldn’t have gone higher, with the Cavaliers shocking virtually everybody by taking him #1. The conditioning, however, turned out to be a huge problem.

His conditioning wasn’t helped by a shoulder injury he had suffered over the summer, which left him behind on a lot of his training. Nor was it helped by asthma and sleep apnea, conditions which were revealed last fall. But that’s no excuse to show up like he did last season, where he looked like a pale imitation of his former self athletically.

Perhaps more concerning than his conditioning (which itself is a huge concern) was his effort level. He simply looked disinterested, on both ends of the court, most of the times that I saw him. Maybe that was the Cavaliers situation, maybe that was his own situation, but combined with his disinterest on the defensive end at UNLV, there’s some concern there.

Finally, his jump shot, which seemed like a staple of his game at UNLV, failed him. Bennett shot only 24.5% fro three point range and 27.7% from between 16′ and the three point line, both far off what he did during his one year in college. To make matters worse, his shot selection seemed to deteriorate from where it was in college, with 28.9% of his field goal attempts coming from between 16′ and the 3 pt line, and 23.6% coming from three point range, combining to represent over 52% of his field goal attempts. Bennett became enamored with a shot he simply wasn’t hitting.

To his credit, he did look worlds better in the summer league, from a conditioning and athletic standpoint. He reportedly lost 20 pounds heading into the summer league, he moved well, and had much of that explosiveness that he had at UNLV back.

This would be Brett Brown’s biggest test, both from testing his conditioning program and his ability to keep a player engaged. This isn’t Royce White, whom the Sixers were seemingly ready to move on from the moment they acquired him, seeing White as the price to obtain Furkan Aldemir. This is an exceptionally talented kid at a premium position, only 13 months removed from being the #1 overall pick. There’s some rewards to be had if they can keep him in shape and keep him engaged on the court.

Risk diversification

“The draft is a crapshoot.” You hear it all the time. And yes, it’s true, there is considerable risk in the draft (although not as much as people make it out to be). So why is Sam Hinkie acquiring so many picks?

Risk diversification. If you’re in the stock market, the riskiest thing to do is to put all of your eggs in one basket. The NBA draft is the same. Joel Embiid is a great prospect. Nerlens Noel has elite defensive potential. Anthony Bennett has an incredibly unique offensive game. But any of them could turn out to be busts, whether it’s due to injury, an inability to translate, an inability to stay in shape, or any of the three. The best way to win the odds is to stockpile lottery balls, not only for that drawing in May but also in the form of talented prospects.

The Sixers are set to have 5 lottery picks in 3 years, while potentially acquiring a player only 13 months removed from being the top pick in the draft. Risk diversification.

This move also falls in line with the Sixers strategy of pouncing on undervalued assets. Anthony Bennett may never become the prospect some saw before the draft, but his shoulder injury, and the impact that had on his conditioning, made his rookie year worse than it might have otherwise been, and significantly lowered his value to the point where the Sixers might be able to grab him for a player who isn’t in their long term plans.

The salary situation

What is Anthony Bennett’s salary situation? He has just over $5.5 million guaranteed to him for this season. The next two seasons are team options, and the Sixers would have to pick up his 2015-16 option (for $5.8 million) by the end of October. While the Sixers were in a similar situation with Royce White last season, Bennett is far more talented, and with the way he showed up in shape for the summer league, I would peg it at a virtually 0% chance that they don’t pick up his 3rd year option.

Is he worth Thad?

In terms of potential, he absolutely has more potential than Thad.

However, with the conditioning concerns, his defensive indifference, and his horrid rookie season, if you held a gun to my head and asked me which player would be more valuable over the next 5 seasons, I’d say Thaddeus Young. Bennett has the potential to be a 2a offensive option, but Thad, to me, is a far safer bet. If I’m being asked probable contributions, I think Thad is higher, and we have to remember Thad is only 25 as well.

But, there are three things in Bennett’s favor:

Salary. While 120% of last years rookie salary is a big figure, he’s cost controlled for 3 more years. Thad has one year left at $9.4 million, then an early termination option, which he’s almost certain to trigger. He’ll likely be looking for a long term deal at a much higher annual salary.
Desire to be here. There have been rumors for over a year that Thad doesn’t want to go through a rebuild. Bennett, on the other hand, is likely more worried about playing time and opportunity, which he’d have plenty of here.
Youth. Bennett just turned 21 this past March.

Truth be told, if I felt confident that Thaddeus Young would be here long term, as I’ve said, I’m more confident that he will be a contributor over the next 5 years than Anthony Bennett. However, since Thad is likely gone after this next season, Anthony Bennett simply has far too much offensive talent to pass up, and would be a great haul for a soon to be former Sixer.

Fixing the NBA’s tanking problem

By Derek Bodner | August 4, 2014 - 9:52 am | Features, NBA, Sixers

9 Comments

How the NBA should fix its tanking problem has become a major point of conversation once again, as Brian Windhorst has reported that the league could vote on a proposed amendment to lottery changes as early as their Board of Governors preseason meeting in October, and the new rules could be in effect next season.

The Sixers, unsurprisingly, are pushing to have this delayed.

The question about reforming the draft lottery ultimately comes down to two questions: 1) What problem are you trying to solve, 2) How did we get here?

The answer to the first question is pretty obvious: the NBA is not trying to solve tanking. Tanking is hardly a new phenomenon, as teams have been making halfhearted efforts to field competitive teams in order to maximize their chances in the draft for years. Many of those teams that are now rife with righteous indignation are doing so after the fruits of their tanking labor have come to pass. The Boston Celtics, who made pretty brazen tanking efforts to get Tim Duncan and Greg Oden, including an effort where their own players were questioning whether their lack of playing time was impacted by the teams desire for losses¹, introducing a fix to this problem is somewhat laughable.

The problem the NBA is trying to fix is the perception issue created by the Sixers, a perception that was created mostly by their unwillingness to pay anything more than lip service to winning now. It was not just that the Sixers tanked, it was that they were open about it that has the league in a frenzy.

It is only in this context that the NBA’s latest proposal makes sense.

A quick recap of the major changes in the latest proposal, as first detailed by Zach Lowe:

The 4 worst teams will have an 11% chance for the top pick. This is down from 25% (worst record), 19.9% (2nd worst), 15.6% (3rd worst), 11.9% (4th worst) and so on.
The 5th pick will have a 10% chance at the top pick (down from 8.8% currently), and decrease slowly from there, ending up with the best lottery team having a 2% chance at the top pick, up from the 0.5% chance that it currently has.
The top 6 draft selections will be in the lottery. Currently, only the top 3 selections are drawn from the lottery, then 4-14 are ordered by the remaining teams with the worst record. This means that, in the current system, the team with the worst record can’t get lower than the 4th pick, 2nd worst record can’t get lower than the 5th pick, etc. Under the new system, the team with the worst record could get as low as the 7th pick in the draft.

There are, ultimately, 2 ways to go about to fix tanking. The first is to disincentive teams enough that they are no longer willing to go through the pains of tanking for the (now decreased) chances of a reward. This is path of least resistance, the method that would be easiest to garner support from owners and the one unlikely to face major objection from the Players Association when it’s time to renegotiate the CBA. This seems to be the NBA’s preferred method.

The second way to fix the problem is take a look at why teams are so convinced that the draft is the best way to build a team long term. Teams that are so desperate that owners are willing to suffer decreased attendance, marketability, and TV negotiation leverage. Why coaches and GM’s are so desperate that they’re willing to put their reputations and careers on the line. And, perhaps most shockingly why fans are so desperate that they are willing to go through years of bad basketball just for the chance of that reward.

I’ve spent a few words on my thoughts on the matter, so I’ll try to keep this short. The NBA has gone out of their way to incentivize building through the draft, at least until you’ve become a destination.

The NBA, after Glenn Robinson commanded a 10 year, $68 million deal without having played a game in the league, tried to curtail the financial risk at the top of the NBA draft. So they introduced a rookie scale, setting a slotted amount that each draft pick can sign for. For example, the slotted salary for Joel Embiid, the #3 pick in the 2014 NBA draft, is $3,689,700 for his first season. Teams and rookies can then negotiate 20% up or down from that number, but in practice all but a handful have signed for 120% of that slot.

So each pick is pretty much set in stone what they will earn. This cost certainty removes considerable risk from the top of the draft. For less than the price of a Mid-Level contract, and only guaranteed for the first two seasons², teams can get their hands on a potential franchise player. The decreased financial risk in the draft inherently makes the draft more valuable.

They then want teams to be able to keep the superstars they’ve drafted, both to give teams a chance to develop them but also so fans, particularly in small markets, don’t have their hopes dashed 4 years after finally getting the chance to draft a superstar. So they make 1st round picks coming off of their rookie scale contract restricted free agents, meaning the original team can match any contract if they choose to do so via a right of first refusal. This increases the value of the draft.

Again, they give you a potential franchise player, making less than the Mid-Level exception, with only 2 guaranteed years if the pick turns out to be a mistake, but with having all the leverage in the world to keep the player with the team that drafted them during most of their physical prime.

It’s the ultimate win-win.

But the NBA goes multiple steps further.

The NBA then artificially limits how much any individual player can earn. Players with 0-6 years of experience can earn 25% of the cap³, after 7-9 years of experience they can earn 30% of the cap, and with 10+ years of experience they can earn 35% of the cap. A slightly odd scale considering a players peak productivity is likely to occur during his second contract, when he has the least negotiating power (entering restricted free agency after a rookie contract while only being able to command 25% of the cap). This has the triple-threat impact of giving the player little choice in where he goes, decreasing other teams chances to lure him away, while also artificially limiting how much a player can earn, virtually guaranteeing that the player will be underpaid when he’s at his most productive.

However, the impact on team building is even more pronounced.

The first major impact is that it allows superteams to be constructed. The odds of being able to add LeBron James to Dwyane Wade under the salary cap is virtually nonexistent if LeBron were able to command $30+ million from some team. If a trio did want to join forces to create a superteam, it would make the financial sacrifice they would all have to make far greater.

The maximum contract also limits the value of cap space. By setting the max any team can offer LeBron, every team with at least $21 million in cap space is on the same playing field⁴. Whether a team has just over $21 million to offer or $40 million, they both can offer the same exact same contract. Limiting this makes LeBron James’ decision less about shrewd cap management and more about destination. Do you have another superstar (reminder: that has had his contract artificially limited) for me to join? Do you have any tax breaks in your municipality? What’s your climate like? Are you my home town? All of these now become very relevant factors in determining where a player will go. Having the most money? Virtually irrelevant.

Having the most cap space moves one step closer to irrelevancy when the soft cap is taken into account⁵. Assuming bird rights, teams can sign their own guys to a maximum contract even if they’re over the cap⁶. So even if the Sixers were the only team with $21 million in cap space to sign LeBron James, the Heat could have been over the salary cap and still been able to offer the same starting salary.

This effectively means a superstar player cannot leave in free agency for more money than his current team can offer. The reason to jettison in free agency, for superstar players, is once again not about money but about destination. And for a have-not team like the Sixers, without a superstar to team up with, they’re unlikely to be the best destination for a free agent.

Free agency could be relevant for a team like the Sixers to try to attract a superstar free agent to make them relevant. But not under the current collective bargaining agreement.

So, implement multiple rules to make the draft less risky. Implement rules to make sure you can retain your drafted player long term on favorable contracts, first due to slotted salary, then artificially limited salary where the maximum they can earn is based on years of experience. Add in the ability for the team that drafts the player to match the first contract a player can actually negotiate, all the while making sure the incumbent team can offer a deal as rich as (or, due to increased raises and term length, richer than) any other team in the league, regardless of their cap situation.

The Sixers didn’t create this problem, the NBA did.

So what is the fix?

This goes back to the question of what you’re actually trying to fix. The NBA is fixing the reaction. They’re taking desperate teams, teams who have very little chance to turn their fortunes around in free agency, and they’re punishing them. They’re decreasing the odds for the one avenue these non-destination teams have to legitimately turn their fortunes around.

They’re fixing the perception, not the problem.

I too desire a league where I don’t have to watch (and cover) a team designed to lose. Where signing a veteran free agent, who may help the team win a couple of games and, more importantly, make the games somewhat entertaining, isn’t seen as counterproductive.

But that’s not the league the NBA has set up. The truth is, signing veterans who might make the games marginally more exciting, but who don’t factor into the long terms plans of the team, is counterproductive. And teams like the Sixers, who are cognizant of this fact and are willing to risk the apathy from the fan base that they’re potentially inviting, should not have the one avenue they legitimately have open to them closed.

Changing the lottery odds might decrease the incentive to tank (although I’m not so sure). That, in turn, might cause teams to be more hesitant to tank, thus helping fix their perception problem. But it does nothing to fix the competitive balance issues that cause the draft, and thus tanking, to be so crucial in the path back to relevancy. Instead, it increases the dependency on luck to get you the talent needed for the first step of the journey.

This has led some to call the proposal to update the lottery odds the right move for the league, seemingly based around the belief that they aren’t screwing up too much rather than it actually solving the core problems. Should I congratulate the NBA for overreacting to a problem, that isn’t too big of a problem, but only overreacting a little bit?

Call me an idealist, but while I’d like to see my team make a legitimate effort to win as many games as they can every year, I don’t want it to come at the expense of hope. And the only way to curtail tanking while not lessening hope is for real, legitimate reform.

If you want to remove tanking, while keeping hope, in my opinion you need to:

Lessen the impact one player can have on a franchise. OR
Increase the value of cap space for have-nots to attract a franchise altering talent.

How?

Admittedly, the how becomes a very tough question. Most of the suggestions I’m about to make have very little chance of happening, either because of resistance from the owners or the Players Association. This is more meant to be a description of my ideal league, one that changes should bring us closer towards, rather than how the NBA should solve the current tanking problem.

(Note: I don’t really think the tanking problem is as big as it has been made out to be. It happens very infrequently: when a team with an owner willing to suffer through the hit of being bad is in charge of a GM who has the job security to execute it, with an upcoming draft class good enough to tank for. I do not think fixing the problem should be a top priority for the league, nor do I think it’s a bigger problem than, say, the competitive balance issues that the league has, and the lack of hope that results from those competitive balance problems. In fact, that’s part of my point: a fix for tanking that lessens hope is not a fix at all.)

1) Have a hard cap

As I mentioned before, the only two ways to truly reduce tanking would be to limit how much impact a single player can have (unrealistic) or to make cap space management more important.

If a team had a hard cap, they’d have far harder decisions to make. Want to pay LeBron enough to keep him? It’s going to be harder to field a competitive team if they cannot continue to go over the cap with exceptions. It also makes teams pay more for mistakes they’ve made in the past.

2) Remove the maximum salary restriction

However, a hard cap would only do so much without removing the maximum salary restriction. The combination of the two would make building superteams virtually impossible, spreading superstars, the league’s most valuable — and scarce — resources out to more teams, making more of the league’s franchises relevant each year.

Removing the maximum salary restriction has a second benefit: it makes decisions harder. Re-signing Kyrie Irving at his maxed-out contract? Easy decision. In essence, the league made that decision for the Cavaliers based solely on limiting how much Irving can earn. However, what if the Cavaliers didn’t have the right of first refusal, were limited by how much cap room they had, and other teams could offer any deal that they wanted?

All of a sudden the league becomes about three things: which general managers manage their cap the best, which general managers correctly identify the dollar value of players the best, and which general managers can find the right pieces to place around the superstar, rather than that initial acquisition of said superstar.

History has shown that general managers, more or less, cannot contain themselves. That the price of these stars will rise and rise until they are out of control. That’s why a true hard cap, and true harsh consequences for reckless spending, is needed as well.

3) No more NBA draft

Wait, what?

The final part of my perfect league is to remove the NBA draft. All eligible players would become free agents.

But wouldn’t that contradict what I’ve said above? Wouldn’t that make the NBA about destinations, and increase the ability of big markets to attract young superstars?

Without a hard cap, and with slotted rookie salaries, absolutely. However, if incoming rookies could negotiate their own contracts, and if teams had a hard salary cap? Then it becomes about which team can offer the most.

Sure, if a superstar happens to enter the draft at the exact year that a team like L.A. has cleared its books of major contracts and can offer the most money, they’ll have a leg up over, say, Milwaukee. But with a hard cap and rookies able to negotiate, big market teams only have an advantage if they do not have a superstar already in place to eat up their cap room. If Kobe is on the books for $24 million, small market teams already have a leg up on the competition.

The NBA already institutes a minimum salary. A minimum salary and a hard maximum salary are the ways to limit the danger of small markets being overrun by larger ones. The hard cap, removal of the maximum salary, and making rookies free agents put the onus on decision making. The allure of L.A. can be overrun by the a combination of money and the desire to play on a contending team.

And, ultimately, it places the premium back on sound cap management and talent evaluation. With GM’s bidding against each other, with a hard cap in place and without a slotted rookie scale, rookies once again become risks. Sure, outbid everybody for that young stud, but the more you do, the more damaging it can become. My perfect league is one built around sound decision making, talent evaluation, and player development, and with real consequences for being wrong.

Also, by making a league based around shrewd cap management, including rookies, the league has removed the benefit of being bad, while also increasing hope to those who are.

Again, none of this will happen. I’m not even suggesting that the NBA should propose any of it, unless you’re aching for a multi-year lockout the next time the CBA is up for renewal. My main point was to list why, through various rule changes, tanking exists, and why it is a problem that the NBA has created.

Don’t want to take the steps to fix it? Fine. Just please, don’t take steps to make the problem worse, and realize that you, the NBA, not Sam Hinkie or the Sixers, are to blame.

Links:

Larry Coon’s CBA FAQ

Footnotes:

¹Ryan Gomes was quoted during the 2006-2007 season as saying he probably would have played had the Celtics not been in the hunt for a high draft pick. Mike Zarren, the Assistant GM for the Celtics during that time, was the one who came up with the wheel proposal, which became public last year.

²This slotted system has gradually gone through iterations over time, changing the amount of guaranteed years to finally settle at the current version, where a first round pick is guaranteed for seasons 1 and 2, then there are team options for seasons 3 and 4.

³There are certain requirements that, from all-nba selections, to being voted as a starter in all-star games, to earning an MVP that, if met, allow a player coming off of his rookie scale contract to earn more, called the 5th year 30% max criteria, adding in a 5th year to the contract and getting 30% of the cap rather than the customary 25% See Larry Coon’s FAQ for more details.

⁴$20,644,400 was the maximum starting salary that a player with 10+ years of experience was able to command this summer.

⁵The NBA’s salary cap is called a soft cap because there are exceptions that allow an over-the-cap team to continue adding players, including exceptions to re-sign your own free agents. Again, see Larry Coon’s FAQ for more details.

⁶Even without Bird rights teams can offer a contract starting at 120% of their salary from the previous season (but not beyond the maximum salary). So, even if LeBron James opts out of his contract after one season in Cleveland, they can still offer him 120% of his 2014-2015 salary, which is well above the max he can earn, despite his lack of Bird rights with Cleveland.

Looking At The Timberwolves As A Thaddeus Young Trade Partner

By Derek Bodner | July 30, 2014 - 12:43 pm | Features, Sixers

13 Comments

The Sixers have long been mentioned as a potential suitor to the seemingly inevitable Kevin Love trade, and due to their cap space and willingness to absorb salary in return for assets will be rumored as a potential suitor until that trade is mercifully completed¹

It’s now being reported that not only could the Sixers help facilitate a Kevin Love to Cleveland trade, but that the Timberwovles are specifically targeting Sixers forward Thaddeus Young to replace the outbound Love.

This combination of the Sixers being able to facilitate a deal financially as well as having an asset that Minnesota is targeting is a pretty good combination for Sam Hinkie to generate leverage. So what can Minnesota offer the Sixers?

Minnesota’s Future Draft Pick Situation

One of the assets that Sam Hinkie seems to consistently be targeting are future draft picks. Unfortunately for the Sixers, Minnesota owes their 2015 1st round draft pick to Phoenix². The pick is top 12 protected in 2015 and 2016, and, if not conveyed by then, turns into a 2016 2nd round pick and a 2017 2nd round pick. Odds are that Minnesota ends up not giving away this first round pick because of the protections, but because there’s the possibility that they will, and because they do not have any 1st round picks coming their way, Minnesota cannot trade a first round pick until at least 2017³. Not that a pick 3+ years down the road is something that Sam Hinkie isn’t willing to wait for, but it’s not something to get overly excited about at this stage of the game, unless there are virtually no protections on it from Minnesota’s side.

The 2nd round picks that Minnesota has aren’t all that much more interesting, as they owe their 2015 second round draft pick to Houston. They do have an incoming 2015 second round pick from Denver, as well as an incoming 2017 second from New Orleans, but they both project to be much later in the draft than their own pick would have been.

Cleveland’s Future Draft Pick Situation

The more interesting picks would be the ones coming from Cleveland. Cleveland is currently set to trade its 2016 first round pick to Boston (top 10 protected) in the Jarrett Jack salary dump from earlier this offseason. However, Cleveland is set to have two 2015 1st round picks: Miami’s 2015 first rounder (top 10 protected), as well as the less-favorable pick between Cleveland and Chicago’s 2015 1st round picks. Either of these could be had in a trade.

The most enticing pick, however, might be the pick that Cleveland is owed from Memphis. The pick has weird protections: it is not conveyed if it falls in the top 5 OR between 15 and 30 in 2015 or 2016, but becomes only top 5 protected in 2017 and 2018, before finally being fully unprotected in 2019.

This as a smart move on Cleveland’s part, as the second half of the protections (protected 15-30 for the next two years) was an effort to try to increase the chances that the pick becomes a lottery pick. Memphis declined slightly last year, from 56-26 to 50-32, coming in as the 7th seed in a tough Western Conference. It’s no guarantee that the Grizzlies will make the playoffs both of the next two seasons. Combine that with little chance of them being bad and falling into the top 5, and that’s a potential lottery pick that could be available.

However, it’s the chance that Memphis does make the playoffs the next two years that really becomes interesting, as Zach Randolph enters his mid-thirties and the chance that a top 10 pick becomes a realistic scenario. If you can delay the gratification (and Sam Hinkie has shown that he is willing to do so), there’s a potentially very attractive pick available in this three team deal.

Young players of interest

With Minnesota’s interest in obtaining Young, their willingness to include a younger player may be spiked. What do they have to offer?

The two most interesting names are their two most recent 1st round draft picks: Gorgui Dieng and Zach LaVine, drafted 21st in 2013 and 13th in 2014, respectively. Dieng averaged an impressive 12.2 points, 12.0 rebounds, and 1.7 blocks in 15 starts late in the season for the Wolves. LaVine is one of the more athletic wing prospects to come out in some time. While I’m not necessarily his biggest fan, he’s the kind of long, athletic wing prospect that I could see Sam Hinkie targeting as a guy who could eventually out-shoot his expected contribution, if he can ever figure out the game. I would be incredibly surprised if either of these guys are moved in the trade, though, as they’re the kind of young assets Minnesota is going to need in the long rebuild they’re about to enter.

The other names to keep an eye on are Shabazz Muhammad, Alexey Shved, and Chase Budinger. Budinger is entering the second year of a 3 year contract⁴. While he’s unlikely to have too much untapped potential, he’s useful and, at $5 million per year, on a relatively friendly contract. Shved, at 25, has thus far struggled to become an efficient option on offense, but he has the kind of size, fluidity, and feel for the game that Sam Hinkie could have an interest in, and would fit right in with the Sixers other perimeter threats who aren’t much of a threat from the perimeter. Muhammad, who slid down the first round in the 2013 draft all the way to 14th, struggled during his rookie season and played only 290 total minutes. It’s hard to really see Muhammad as a Sam Hinkie type of player, with his defensive indifference, poor steal rate, mid-range based game, but he has only one guaranteed year left on his deal⁵, and it’s possible Hinkie could take him on as a talented reclamation project, but that would be as a throw-in to the deal, not as a centerpiece.

For the most part I haven’t touched on the Cavs players, mostly in the interest of brevity, and because those have been talked about extensively over the past few weeks. This article was mostly centered around the new information, which was the Wolves interest in Thaddeus Young. That being said, some of the Cavs players (Dion Waiters, mostly) are obviously in play. Anthony Bennett has been rumored as well, but I would guess he is more likely to head to Minnesota. That being said, the incredibly disappointed (but looking much better in summer league) former #1 overall pick is somebody to keep an eye on.

What else would the Sixers have to take back?

With the Wolves over the cap⁶, it’s very likely that the Sixers would have to take back a less-than-desirable contract to help facilitate the deal. From the Wolves side, that would likely be Kevin Martin, who has three years and roughly $21 million remaining, with the final season being a team option. Martin would provide the Sixers with an offensive option from the perimeter and plays the “3 point and at-the-rim” style of offense that Hinkie and Brown are likely to employ (he has shot 38.5% from three point range for his career and averaged 6.0 free throw attempts per game in just under 31 minutes), but Martin will turn 32 later this year, has struggled with injuries throughout his career, and as such isn’t likely to be a long term piece for the teams future. Ideally you wouldn’t want him eating into the teams cap space, as the Sixers are likely to start looking to supplement their drafting with finding supporting pieces through free agency. But taking back Martin’s contract is likely the cost of doing business in this trade, and will allow the Sixers to raise their asking price, because not only are the Wolves getting a player they want (Thaddeus Young), but they’re also shedding an undesirable contract (Martin). Martin would at least provide a little bit of relief on the offensive end and allow Michael Carter-Williams to play a role that he’s more likely to look to fill long term than being the top offensive option.

Outside of that, Minnesota’s cap situation is fairly positive. They could take back Alexey Shved, who is on the final year of his rookie deal at $3.2 million. I talked about Shved briefly above, and his combination of inconsistency from the perimeter and struggles finishing around the hoop make it a little bit grim whether he’d ever really contribute enough offensively. He is wonderfully creative off the pick and roll, which could help the Sixers ball movement some in the half-court. If he could ever develop consistency as a jump shooter⁷ he could carve a roll for himself in the NBA, but that’s an “if” at this point.

Summary

Assets available in a trade:

“First available” (2017) Minnesota 1st round draft pick
2015 Miami first round pick (top 10 protected)
“Less favorable” 2015 1st round pick between Cleveland and Chicago
2015 Memphis first round pick (protected 1-5, 15-30 in 2015 & 2016, protected 1-5 in 2017 & 2018, unprotected in 2019)
Young players like Gorgui Dieng, Zach LaVine, Alexey Shved, Chase Budinger, and Shabazz Muhammad.

In my opinion, the Memphis pick, as well as a future Minnesota pick (depending on the protections) are the two most intriguing assets that might actually be viable for the Sixers to obtain, although it would be difficult for me to see Minnesota giving up that high of a pick, even far down the line, in such a trade.

I haven’t mentioned Andrew Wiggins up to this point because I don’t think there’s any real chance the Sixers have in prying him away from Minnesota. He is Minnesota’s prize in giving up Kevin Love, and nothing the Sixers have to offer can get him away from them, in my opinion. Of course, I’d love to be wrong.

Unfortunately, because of the Andrew Wiggins signing, this is a rumor/situation that will drag one for quite a bit longer.

Footnotes:

¹With Cleveland signing Andrew Wiggins, the trade (assuming Andrew Wiggins is involved in it) cannot be traded until 30 days have passed. Wiggins signed on July 24th, meaning the earliest that he could be traded is August 23rd. It also means that when Wiggins is traded his outgoing salary will count for roughly $5.5 million, assuming he gets 120% of the rookie scale contract for the #1 pick. Had he previously been traded they would have been trading his draft rights, and his (expected) salary would not have been included in matching salaries for the trade.

²The Stepien rule dictates that a team can’t fail to have a first round pick in back to back years. Two key points on this rule: 1) It only deals with future picks owed, not the past. Meaning if a team didn’t have a pick in the 2014 draft, that’s irrelevant. They can actually not have a pick in 2014 and still trade their 2015 pick, it’s just they can’t fail to have a pick in the next two upcoming drafts. 2) It only specifies not having a pick, not necessarily not having their own pick. So if a team, say Minnesota, already is set to pay out their 2015 pick. They can trade their 2016 pick as well, as long as they acquire an additional first round pick in 2015 or 2016.

³Unless Minnesota acquires another pick in the deal. Remember, the Stepien rule just specifies that they cannot fail to have first round picks in consecutive years. If they acquire another one, they can trade their own pick 2 years in a row, although the Sixers would still have to wait until the debt to Phoenix has been paid, meaning the Sixers would get Minnesota’s first available pick.

⁴2015-16, the final season in Budinger’s contract, is a player option.

⁵For rookie scale (first round pick) contracts, the first two seasons are guaranteed, then season three and four are team options. Muhammad is entering his second season, and the option for his third season would have to be picked up by the end of October, similar to the situation the Sixers were in when they acquired Royce White last summer.

⁶Even though the Sixers are under the cap, the Wolves are not, so they have to send out money in order to take on Thad’s contract. See Larry Coon’s excellent cbafaq.com for more information.

⁷So far Shved has shot 29.5% from nba three point range on 390 attempts in his nba career. He shot 23% overall on jump shots last season, 27.7% on catch and shoots jumpers, a horrible 16.2% on jump shots off the dribble, and 22.6% when he shoots off the pick and roll. All are well below average.

Category Archives: Features

Avoiding Mediocrity Not Necessary For Sixers

Michael Carter-Williams, draft picks, and the fear of the unknown

Michael Carter-Williams League-Wide Rankings

Sixers Offense Before/After Trade Deadline

The Sixers Are Building Through The Draft, Not Tanking, And It Really Isn’t Revolutionary

2015 Trade Deadline Predictions

The Sixers Rebuilding Plan – Summary

Dario Saric’s Contract Situation

How the Sixers did — and didn’t — turn a profit last year

Sixers to get Anthony Bennett? A look at the former #1 overall pick

Fixing the NBA’s tanking problem

Looking At The Timberwolves As A Thaddeus Young Trade Partner

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