Sixers to get Anthony Bennett? A look at the former #1 overall pick

anthony-bennet-cavs

Yesterday afternoon, Brian Windhorst was on ESPN Radio in New York saying that the Kevin Love to Cleveland trade is agreed upon in principle, with the huge caveat that something could happen sometime between now and August 23rd, when it can finally become official.  Still, the news that the two sides have seemingly come to an agreement on compensation for Love was big news.

Windhorst then went on to speculate about the Sixers involvement in the trade.  It’s worth listening to the audio (linked above, starting at around the 9:45 mark), but it seemed as if Windhorst’s tone shifted from reporting fact (Cleveland & Minnesota have an agreement in principle) to speculation when talking about the Sixers.  Sean O’Connor over at LibertyBallers did a good job of transcribing the audio.

“But before the papers have been signed, there’s this handshake agreement that: Kevin Love to the Cavs, Andrew Wiggins to the Timberwolves, and I believe Thaddeus Young will end up in Minnesota, either as part of a separate deal or as part of a three-way deal, possibly Anthony Bennett who’s on the Cavs right now could get re-routed to Philadelphia in part of a deal for Thaddeus Young. There will be draft picks involved, but essentially what you need to know if you’re an NBA fan: Kevin Love will end up in Cleveland barring anything unforeseen, and Andrew Wiggins will end up in Minnesota.”

— Brian Windhorst, ESPN Radio New York

As mentioned, “I believe” and “possibly” are two words that make it seem like he’s less certain on Philadelphia’s involvement then he is on the Cleveland/Minnesota portion being agreed upon.

It’s also worth noting, that while many are reporting that the Sixers could get a draft pick back in the trade, and while that’s certainly a possibility, Windhorst doesn’t specifically say that there will be a pick coming back to Philadelphia, just that picks will be involved in the trade.  Still, for a breakdown of potential picks that the Sixers could receive, check out the article I wrote last week on the subject.

Still, despite the fact that the Sixers portion of it came off as speculation, with how connected Windhorst is to the deal, combined with Marc Stein’s report last week that the Wolves are specifically targeting Thaddeus Young, along with the report that the Sixers would have accepted Anthony Bennett in the Jrue Holiday/Nerlens Noel trade last summer, Windhorst’s report that the Sixers could end up with Anthony Bennett is certainly newsworthy, and worth a closer look.

(Note: Last fall I was part of a group that sat down with Sam Hinkie for an extended Q&A session over breakfast, and he addressed the rumors that they would have taken Bennett in the trade.  His response was that he never would have said that, because revealing a draft board is “the shortest of the short games,” specifically because players become available later in their careers.  Interesting that now, just 10 months after that breakfast, he’s on the verge of acquiring one of those rumored players).

Why the wait?

We’re in this holding period because Cleveland signed Andrew Wiggins to a contract on July 24th.  Because of this, Cleveland has to wait at least 30 days before Andrew Wiggins can be included in a trade.

Why would they sign Andrew Wiggins and delay the completion of the trade, when it has seemed like this was inevitable since the time they signed LeBron?  The answer could be for salary matching purposes.  Kevin Love is set to earn $15.7 million this upcoming season, and because Cleveland is now over the cap, they have to get close to sending out that much salary in return.  Before Wiggins signed his contract, his outbound salary counted as $0 in trade calculations.  Now that he has signed his contract, when he is traded he will count at (a presumed) $5.5 million in the trade.  If the Cavaliers made this trade before signing Wiggins, they would have had to have found another player(s) to add to make up that difference.

Why are the Sixers involved?

One thing to make clear, it is not necessary for the Sixers to be involved in this trade.  Non-taxpaying teams (which the Cavs are) only have to get their outbound salary within $5 million of what they are receiving (on trades where their outgoing salary totals between $9.8 million and $19.6 million).  Wiggins’ and Bennett’s salaries total roughly $11.09 million, which falls into this range is within $5 million of Kevin Love’s salary ($16.07 million).

That being said, the Sixers could be involved for either of two reasons.

One reason is that either the Wolves of the Cavs could look to dump an unwanted contract on the Sixers, such as Kevin Martin (3 years, $21 million remaining).  The purpose of the Sixers would mainly be to take back salary on a player who would be an unnecessary luxury on a rebuilding team like the Wolves.  However, reports are starting to suggest that Flip Saunders and Minnesota may want Martin around for the rebuild.  If so, the necessity to include the Sixers as a 3rd team lessens dramatically.

Even without that, the Sixers are being linked to the trade because of Minnesota’s specific interest in acquiring Thaddeus Young.  No longer are the Sixers mentioned as a suitor just because they have cap space, but because they have a specific asset that Minnesota is looking for.

Now, why Minnesota would be targeting Young I’m not so sure.  From a basketball standpoint, it makes perfect sense, as Young is only 25 years old and is an incredibly valuable basketball player, and one who should still be valuable 3-4 years down the line when the Wolves (hopefully) are through the hard part of their rebuild and regaining relevancy.  However, with the reports that Young has been displeased with the Sixers rebuild, I can’t envision him being happy going through the same process in Minnesota.  Since Young possesses an early termination option after this season, it seems odd that Minnesota is specifically targeting a one year rental.

Anthony Bennett the draft prospect

When looking at Anthony Bennett, it’s hard to really get a gauge on his value.  On the one hand, he’s barely over 13 months removed from being the top pick in the draft.  On the other hand, he just came off arguably the worst rookie season for a #1 overall pick in the modern era.

While Bennett going #1 was a surprise to me, I still had him rated at #4 on my own personal draft board heading into the draft.

Measurables:

As Bennett was nursing a shoulder injury, he did not participate at the 2013 NBA combine, so the last public measurement we have for him is the 2012 Nike Hoop Summit.  He measured 6’7″ in shoes there, weighing 239 pounds and with a 7’1″ wingspan.  He is listed at 6’8″ and 259 lbs on his nba.com player profile.

While at 6”7″ in shoes, Bennett would certainly be undersized, his 7’1″ wingspan would be slightly above average for a power forward, and also above average for a player of his size.  Unfortunately, for a post player the measurement I’m more interested in is standing reach, and because of his injury last year we don’t have good data on that.  That being said, I would classify him as an undersized power forward, but one with long enough arms to help him overcome that.

Stats at UNLV

A quick look at some stats from while Bennett was at UNLV.

Year
GP
MPG
PPG
RPG
APG
SPG
BPG
Out of Conference1929.419.58.91.20.81.3
In Conference1624.412.17.20.70.51.1
2012-13 UNLV (all)3527.116.18.11.00.71.2
Year
ORtg
DRtg
USG%
PER
Win Shares
WS/40
OWS
DWS
2012-13 UNLV (conference)99.690.226.9%20.41.40.1460.50.9
2012-13 UNLV (all)117.689.327.5%28.35.70.2403.52.3
Year
OReb%
DReb%
blk%
stl%
ft rate
2pt%
3pta-3ptm
3pt%
2012-13 UNLV (conference)10.7%20.8%4.7%1.2%?53%13-3735.1%
2012-13 UNLV (all)10.3%21.8%4.6%1.5%46.7%58.7%36-9637.5%

The immediate takeaway is: man, did Anthony Bennett feast on a relatively weak non-conference schedule, which according to Kenpom.com was ranked 180th toughest in the country, including teams such as Chicago St (ranked 287th per Kenpom, where Bennett scored 22 points on 7-11 shooting), Cal St. Bakersfield (ranked 241st, 28 points on 10-13 shooting), Northern Arizona (ranked 294th, 22 points on 9-13 shooting), Jacksonville St (ranked 206th, 12 points on 3-6 shooting), Hawaii (ranked 213th, 16 points on 6-12 shooting), and Portland (ranked 262nd, 18 points on 6-11 shooting).

All teams have cupcakes on their schedule, of course.  But the combination of UNLV’s relatively weak out of conference schedule and his pretty big in conference / out of conference splits inflated Bennett’s overall stats just a bit.

Still, Bennett’s in-conference play (against a relatively strong Mountain West Conference) provided quite a bit of optimism, averaging 12.1 points, 7.2 rebounds in only 24 minutes per game, yielding a 20.4 PER and 0.146 win shares per 40 minutes (remember, WS/40 is used in college, whereas if you’re used to the NBA stat, it’s WS/48.  Adjust accordingly).  He had the highest PER (28.3) of any freshman player drafted that season (second highest was Nerlens Noel at 27.3).

Skills shown at UNLV

What made Bennett so intriguing of a prospect was high combination of strength, athleticism, and versatile offensive game, which, combined with his good length, allowed him to overcome his short height.

Bennett got a high percentage of offense in the post, where his strength, footwork, and ability to make moves over either shoulder made him a real threat, and was a solid projectable skill for him at the next level.  Combining that with his accurate outside shot (37.5% from three on nearly 3 attempts per game), which included being able to hit shots off the dribble at an extremely impressive rate considering his size, and he was a tough cover.  All of this then opened up a dribble drive game where he once again showcased that surprising athleticism and how comfortable he was handling the basketball with either hand, and he had an incredibly diverse skill set for a big man.  For as much as the NBA has become about the stretch power forward, Bennett could theoretically fill that role, while still providing a considerable threat scoring in the paint off of legitimate post-up skills, dribble drives, and offensive rebounds.  He brought potentially the best of both worlds.

His biggest pitfall, besides potential weight concerns, was on the defensive side of the court.  A glass-half-full kind of person would say “his effort level was inconsistent.”  I’m not sure I’d agree with that.  His effort level was fairly consistent, it was just consistently bad.  From effort, to positioning, to stance and technique, Bennett could best be described as a disinterested defender.  He can hopefully be hidden somewhat next to Nerlens Noel and (eventually) Joel Embiid, but Brett Brown will have his hands full trying to get him to contribute (outside of rebounding, which he’s very good at) on this side of the court.

For more information, go check out our DraftExpress scouting report from before the draft.

His rookie season

Then came his rookie season.  Again, a glass-half-full type would call it a struggle.  A glass-half-empty type would call it possibly the worst rookie season for a #1 overall pick in 30+ years.

Last year for the Cavs, Bennett 4.2 points per in just over 12.8 minutes per game, shooting 35.6% from the field.  He generate -0.4 win shares on the season (-0.028/48), including -1.1 offensive win shares, with a true shooting percentage of 42.5% and a PER of 6.9.

No #1 overall pick has done worse in ANY of win shares, offensive win shares, PER, or true shooting percentage.  Here are some of the closest “competitors” to Anthony Bennett’s rookie season:

Player
Season
Minutes
PER
Win Shares
Offensive Win Shares
TS%
Anthony Bennett2013-146636.9-0.4-1.142.5%
Kwame Brown2001-0281711.20.80.045.0%
Kenyon Martin2000-01227213.42.1-0.447.2%
Michael Olowokandi1998-99127911.8-0.3-0.844.5%
Pervis Ellison1989-9086610.30.4-0.547.5%
Danny Manning1988-8995013.40.70.053.8%
Mark Aguirre1981-82146817.31.91.051.4%

The outliers on this list of Kenyon Martin and Danny Manning, who went on to have strong careers, although with Martin’s value being based off of his defense (a clear weakness of Bennett’s) and with Manning being far more of a perimeter player, drawing any parallel with these two would be difficult.  And none of these seasons really even approached Bennett’s level of ineptitude in any of the aforementioned stats.

To be fair, Bennett did show signs of life at the end of the season, averaging 7.2 points and 4.8 rebounds on a 51.9% true shooting percentage in February, before missing quite a bit of time at the end of the season with a left patellar tendon strain.  But, by all accounts his rookie season was an abject failure.

Why?

The why is, of course, as important as the what in this instance, mostly out of the hope that it could be corrected.  Injuries and conditioning played a very big role in his disappointing rookie season, with his conditioning sapping him of his quickness and explosiveness, two staples of his game.

Right before the draft, DraftExpress was reporting that his conditioning had seemingly sent his stock into a tailspin.  Well, one out of two isn’t bad.  His stock, obviously, couldn’t have gone higher, with the Cavaliers shocking virtually everybody by taking him #1.  The conditioning, however, turned out to be a huge problem.

His conditioning wasn’t helped by a shoulder injury he had suffered over the summer, which left him behind on a lot of his training.  Nor was it helped by asthma and sleep apnea, conditions which were revealed last fall.  But that’s no excuse to show up like he did last season, where he looked like a pale imitation of his former self athletically.

Perhaps more concerning than his conditioning (which itself is a huge concern) was his effort level.  He simply looked disinterested, on both ends of the court, most of the times that I saw him.  Maybe that was the Cavaliers situation, maybe that was his own situation, but combined with his disinterest on the defensive end at UNLV, there’s some concern there.

Finally, his jump shot, which seemed like a staple of his game at UNLV, failed him.  Bennett shot only 24.5% fro three point range and 27.7% from between 16′ and the three point line, both far off what he did during his one year in college.  To make matters worse, his shot selection seemed to deteriorate from where it was in college, with 28.9% of his field goal attempts coming from between 16′ and the 3 pt line, and 23.6% coming from three point range, combining to represent over 52% of his field goal attempts.  Bennett became enamored with a shot he simply wasn’t hitting.

To his credit, he did look worlds better in the summer league, from a conditioning and athletic standpoint.  He reportedly lost 20 pounds heading into the summer league, he moved well, and had much of that explosiveness that he had at UNLV back.

This would be Brett Brown’s biggest test, both from testing his conditioning program and his ability to keep a player engaged.  This isn’t Royce White, whom the Sixers were seemingly ready to move on from the moment they acquired him, seeing White as the price to obtain Furkan Aldemir.  This is an exceptionally talented kid at a premium position, only 13 months removed from being the #1 overall pick.  There’s some rewards to be had if they can keep him in shape and keep him engaged on the court.

Risk diversification

“The draft is a crapshoot.”  You hear it all the time.  And yes, it’s true, there is considerable risk in the draft (although not as much as people make it out to be).  So why is Sam Hinkie acquiring so many picks?

Risk diversification.  If you’re in the stock market, the riskiest thing to do is to put all of your eggs in one basket.  The NBA draft is the same.  Joel Embiid is a great prospect.  Nerlens Noel has elite defensive potential.  Anthony Bennett has an incredibly unique offensive game.  But any of them could turn out to be busts, whether it’s due to injury, an inability to translate, an inability to stay in shape, or any of the three.  The best way to win the odds is to stockpile lottery balls, not only for that drawing in May but also in the form of talented prospects.

The Sixers are set to have 5 lottery picks in 3 years, while potentially acquiring a player only 13 months removed from being the top pick in the draft.  Risk diversification.

This move also falls in line with the Sixers strategy of pouncing on undervalued assets.  Anthony Bennett may never become the prospect some saw before the draft, but his shoulder injury, and the impact that had on his conditioning, made his rookie year worse than it might have otherwise been, and significantly lowered his value to the point where the Sixers might be able to grab him for a player who isn’t in their long term plans.

The salary situation

What is  Anthony Bennett’s salary situation?  He has just over $5.5 million guaranteed to him for this season.  The next two seasons are team options, and the Sixers would have to pick up his 2015-16 option (for $5.8 million) by the end of October.  While the Sixers were in a similar situation with Royce White last season, Bennett is far more talented, and with the way he showed up in shape for the summer league, I would peg it at a virtually 0% chance that they don’t pick up his 3rd year option.

Is he worth Thad?

In terms of potential, he absolutely has more potential than Thad.

However, with the conditioning concerns, his defensive indifference, and his horrid rookie season, if you held a gun to my head and asked me which player would be more valuable over the next 5 seasons, I’d say Thaddeus Young.  Bennett has the potential to be a 2a offensive option, but Thad, to me, is a far safer bet.  If I’m being asked probable contributions, I think Thad is higher, and we have to remember Thad is only 25 as well.

But, there are three things in Bennett’s favor:

  • Salary.  While 120% of last years rookie salary is a big figure, he’s cost controlled for 3 more years.  Thad has one year left at $9.4 million, then an early termination option, which he’s almost certain to trigger.  He’ll likely be looking for a long term deal at a much higher annual salary.
  • Desire to be here.  There have been rumors for over a year that Thad doesn’t want to go through a rebuild.  Bennett, on the other hand, is likely more worried about playing time and opportunity, which he’d have plenty of here.
  • Youth.  Bennett just turned 21 this past March.

Truth be told, if I felt confident that Thaddeus Young would be here long term, as I’ve said, I’m more confident that he will be a contributor over the next 5 years than Anthony Bennett.  However, since Thad is likely gone after this next season, Anthony Bennett simply has far too much offensive talent to pass up, and would be a great haul for a soon to be former Sixer.

Fixing the NBA’s tanking problem

lottery

How the NBA should fix its tanking problem has become a major point of conversation once again, as Brian Windhorst has reported that the league could vote on a proposed amendment to lottery changes as early as their Board of Governors preseason meeting in October, and the new rules could be in effect next season.

The Sixers, unsurprisingly, are pushing to have this delayed.

The question about reforming the draft lottery ultimately comes down to two questions: 1) What problem are you trying to solve, 2) How did we get here?

The answer to the first question is pretty obvious: the NBA is not trying to solve tanking. Tanking is hardly a new phenomenon, as teams have been making halfhearted efforts to field competitive teams in order to maximize their chances in the draft for years. Many of those teams that are now rife with righteous indignation are doing so after the fruits of their tanking labor have come to pass. The Boston Celtics, who made pretty brazen tanking efforts to get Tim Duncan and Greg Oden, including an effort where their own players were questioning whether their lack of playing time was impacted by the teams desire for losses1, introducing a fix to this problem is somewhat laughable.

The problem the NBA is trying to fix is the perception issue created by the Sixers, a perception that was created mostly by their unwillingness to pay anything more than lip service to winning now. It was not just that the Sixers tanked, it was that they were open about it that has the league in a frenzy.

It is only in this context that the NBA’s latest proposal makes sense.

A quick recap of the major changes in the latest proposal, as first detailed by Zach Lowe:

  • The 4 worst teams will have an 11% chance for the top pick.  This is down from 25% (worst record), 19.9% (2nd worst), 15.6% (3rd worst), 11.9% (4th worst) and so on.
  • The 5th pick will have a 10% chance at the top pick (down from 8.8% currently), and decrease slowly from there, ending up with the best lottery team having a 2% chance at the top pick, up from the 0.5% chance that it currently has.
  • The top 6 draft selections will be in the lottery.  Currently, only the top 3 selections are drawn from the lottery, then 4-14 are ordered by the remaining teams with the worst record.  This means that, in the current system, the team with the worst record can’t get lower than the 4th pick, 2nd worst record can’t get lower than the 5th pick, etc.  Under the new system, the team with the worst record could get as low as the 7th pick in the draft.

There are, ultimately, 2 ways to go about to fix tanking.  The first is to disincentive teams enough that they are no longer willing to go through the pains of tanking for the (now decreased) chances of a reward.  This is path of least resistance, the method that would be easiest to garner support from owners and the one unlikely to face major objection from the Players Association when it’s time to renegotiate the CBA.  This seems to be the NBA’s preferred method.

The second way to fix the problem is take a look at why teams are so convinced that the draft is the best way to build a team long term.  Teams that are so desperate that owners are willing to suffer decreased attendance, marketability, and TV negotiation leverage.  Why coaches and GM’s are so desperate that they’re willing to put their reputations and careers on the line.  And, perhaps most shockingly why fans are so desperate that they are willing to go through years of bad basketball just for the chance of that reward.

I’ve spent a few words on my thoughts on the matter, so I’ll try to keep this short.  The NBA has gone out of their way to incentivize building through the draft, at least until you’ve become a destination.

The NBA, after Glenn Robinson commanded a 10 year, $68 million deal without having played a game in the league, tried to curtail the financial risk at the top of the NBA draft.  So they introduced a rookie scale, setting a slotted amount that each draft pick can sign for.  For example, the slotted salary for Joel Embiid, the #3 pick in the 2014 NBA draft, is $3,689,700 for his first season.  Teams and rookies can then negotiate 20% up or down from that number, but in practice all but a handful have signed for 120% of that slot.

So each pick is pretty much set in stone what they will earn.  This cost certainty removes considerable risk from the top of the draft.  For less than the price of a Mid-Level contract, and only guaranteed for the first two seasons2, teams can get their hands on a potential franchise player.  The decreased financial risk in the draft inherently makes the draft more valuable.

They then want teams to be able to keep the superstars they’ve drafted, both to give teams a chance to develop them but also so fans, particularly in small markets, don’t have their hopes dashed 4 years after finally getting the chance to draft a superstar. So they make 1st round picks coming off of their rookie scale contract restricted free agents, meaning the original team can match any contract if they choose to do so via a right of first refusal.  This increases the value of the draft.

Again, they give you a potential franchise player, making less than the Mid-Level exception, with only 2 guaranteed years if the pick turns out to be a mistake, but with having all the leverage in the world to keep the player with the team that drafted them during most of their physical prime.

It’s the ultimate win-win.

But the NBA goes multiple steps further.

The NBA then artificially limits how much any individual player can earn.  Players with 0-6 years of experience can earn 25% of the cap3, after 7-9 years of experience they can earn 30% of the cap, and with 10+ years of experience they can earn 35% of the cap.  A slightly odd scale considering a players peak productivity is likely to occur during his second contract, when he has the least negotiating power (entering restricted free agency after a rookie contract while only being able to command 25% of the cap).  This has the triple-threat impact of giving the player little choice in where he goes, decreasing other teams chances to lure him away, while also artificially limiting how much a player can earn, virtually guaranteeing that the player will be underpaid when he’s at his most productive.

However, the impact on team building is even more pronounced.

The first major impact is that it allows superteams to be constructed.  The odds of being able to add LeBron James to Dwyane Wade under the salary cap is virtually nonexistent if LeBron were able to command $30+ million from some team.  If a trio did want to join forces to create a superteam, it would make the financial sacrifice they would all have to make far greater.

The maximum contract also limits the value of cap space.  By setting the max any team can offer LeBron, every team with at least $21 million in cap space is on the same playing field4.  Whether a team has just over $21 million to offer or $40 million, they both can offer the same exact same contract.  Limiting this makes LeBron James’ decision less about shrewd cap management and more about destination.  Do you have another superstar (reminder: that has had his contract artificially limited) for me to join?  Do you have any tax breaks in your municipality?  What’s your climate like?  Are you my  home town?  All of these now become very relevant factors in determining where a player will go.  Having the most money?  Virtually irrelevant.

Having the most cap space moves one step closer to irrelevancy when the soft cap is taken into account5.  Assuming bird rights, teams can sign their own guys to a maximum contract even if they’re over the cap6.  So even if the Sixers were the only team with $21 million in cap space to sign LeBron James, the Heat could have been over the salary cap and still been able to offer the same starting salary.

This effectively means a superstar player cannot leave in free agency for more money than his current team can offer.  The reason to jettison in free agency, for superstar players, is once again not about money but about destination.  And for a have-not team like the Sixers, without a superstar to team up with, they’re unlikely to be the best destination for a free agent.

Free agency could be relevant for a team like the Sixers to try to attract a superstar free agent to make them relevant.  But not under the current collective bargaining agreement.

So, implement multiple rules to make the draft less risky.  Implement rules to make sure you can retain your drafted player long term on favorable contracts, first due to slotted salary, then artificially limited salary where the maximum they can earn is based on years of experience.  Add in the ability for the team that drafts the player to match the first contract a player can actually negotiate, all the while making sure the incumbent team can offer a deal as rich as (or, due to increased raises and term length, richer than) any other team in the league, regardless of their cap situation.

The Sixers didn’t create this problem, the NBA did.

So what is the fix?

This goes back to the question of what you’re actually trying to fix.  The NBA is fixing the reaction.  They’re taking desperate teams, teams who have very little chance to turn their fortunes around in free agency, and they’re punishing them. They’re decreasing the odds for the one avenue these non-destination teams have to legitimately turn their fortunes around.

They’re fixing the perception, not the problem.

I too desire a league where I don’t have to watch (and cover) a team designed to lose.  Where signing a veteran free agent, who may help the team win a couple of games and, more importantly, make the games somewhat entertaining, isn’t seen as counterproductive.

But that’s not the league the NBA has set up.  The truth is, signing veterans who might make the games marginally more exciting, but who don’t factor into the long terms plans of the team, is counterproductive.  And teams like the Sixers, who are cognizant of this fact and are willing to risk the apathy from the fan base that they’re potentially inviting, should not have the one avenue they legitimately have open to them closed.

Changing the lottery odds might decrease the incentive to tank (although I’m not so sure).  That, in turn, might cause teams to be more hesitant to tank, thus helping fix their perception problem.  But it does nothing to fix the competitive balance issues that cause the draft, and thus tanking, to be so crucial in the path back to relevancy.  Instead, it increases the dependency on luck to get you the talent needed for the first step of the journey.

This has led some to call the proposal to update the lottery odds the right move for the league, seemingly based around the belief that they aren’t screwing up too much rather than it actually solving the core problems.  Should I congratulate the NBA for overreacting to a problem, that isn’t too big of a problem, but only overreacting a little bit?

Call me an idealist, but while I’d like to see my team make a legitimate effort to win as many games as they can every year, I don’t want it to come at the expense of hope.  And the only way to curtail tanking while not lessening hope is for real, legitimate reform.

If you want to remove tanking, while keeping hope, in my opinion you need to:

  1. Lessen the impact one player can have on a franchise.  OR
  2. Increase the value of cap space for have-nots to attract a franchise altering talent.

How?

Admittedly, the how becomes a very tough question.  Most of the suggestions I’m about to make have very little chance of happening, either because of resistance from the owners or the Players Association.  This is more meant to be a description of my ideal league, one that changes should bring us closer towards, rather than how the NBA should solve the current tanking problem.

(Note: I don’t really think the tanking problem is as big as it has been made out to be.  It happens very infrequently: when a team with an owner willing to suffer through the hit of being bad is in charge of a GM who has the job security to execute it, with an upcoming draft class good enough to tank for.  I do not think fixing the problem should be a top priority for the league, nor do I think it’s a bigger problem than, say, the competitive balance issues that the league has, and the lack of hope that results from those competitive balance problems.  In fact, that’s part of my point: a fix for tanking that lessens hope is not a fix at all.)

1) Have a hard cap

As I mentioned before, the only two ways to truly reduce tanking would be to limit how much impact a single player can have (unrealistic) or to make cap space management more important.

If a team had a hard cap, they’d have far harder decisions to make.  Want to pay LeBron enough to keep him?  It’s going to be harder to field a competitive team if they cannot continue to go over the cap with exceptions.  It also makes teams pay more for mistakes they’ve made in the past.

2) Remove the maximum salary restriction

However, a hard cap would only do so much without removing the maximum salary restriction.  The combination of the two would make building superteams virtually impossible, spreading superstars, the league’s most valuable — and scarce — resources out to more teams, making more of the league’s franchises relevant each year.

Removing the maximum salary restriction has a second benefit: it makes decisions harder. Re-signing Kyrie Irving at his maxed-out contract?  Easy decision.  In essence, the league made that decision for the Cavaliers based solely on limiting how much Irving can earn.  However, what if the Cavaliers didn’t have the right of first refusal, were limited by how much cap room they had, and other teams could offer any deal that they wanted?

All of a sudden the league becomes about three things: which general managers manage their cap the best, which general managers correctly identify the dollar value of players the best, and which general managers  can find the right pieces to place around the superstar, rather than that initial acquisition of said superstar.

History has shown that general managers, more or less, cannot contain themselves.  That the price of these stars will rise and rise until they are out of control.  That’s why a true hard cap, and true harsh consequences for reckless spending, is needed as well.

3) No more NBA draft

Wait, what?

The final part of my perfect league is to remove the NBA draft.  All eligible players would become free agents.

But wouldn’t that contradict what I’ve said above?  Wouldn’t that make the NBA about destinations, and increase the ability of big markets to attract young superstars?

Without a hard cap, and with slotted rookie salaries, absolutely.  However, if incoming rookies could negotiate their own contracts, and if teams had a hard salary cap?  Then it becomes about which team can offer the most.

Sure, if a superstar happens to enter the draft at the exact year that a team like L.A. has cleared its books of major contracts and can offer the most money, they’ll have a leg up over, say, Milwaukee.  But with a hard cap and rookies able to negotiate, big market teams only have an advantage if they do not have a superstar already in place to eat up their cap room.  If Kobe is on the books for $24 million, small market teams already have a leg up on the competition.

The NBA already institutes a minimum salary.  A minimum salary and a hard maximum salary are the ways to limit the danger of small markets being overrun by larger ones.  The hard cap, removal of the maximum salary, and making rookies free agents put the onus on decision making.  The allure of L.A. can be overrun by the a combination of money and the desire to play on a contending team.

And, ultimately, it places the premium back on sound cap management and talent evaluation.  With GM’s bidding against each other, with a hard cap in place and without a slotted rookie scale, rookies once again become risks.  Sure, outbid everybody for that young stud, but the more you do, the more damaging it can become.  My perfect league is one built around sound decision making, talent evaluation, and player development, and with real consequences for being wrong.

Also, by making a league based around shrewd cap management, including rookies, the league has removed the benefit of being bad, while also increasing hope to those who are.

Again, none of this will happen.  I’m not even suggesting that the NBA should propose any of it, unless you’re aching for a multi-year lockout the next time the CBA is up for renewal.  My main point was to list why, through various rule changes, tanking exists, and why it is a problem that the NBA has created.

Don’t want to take the steps to fix it?  Fine.  Just please, don’t take steps to make the problem worse, and realize that you, the NBA, not Sam Hinkie or the Sixers, are to blame.

Links:

Footnotes:

1Ryan Gomes was quoted during the 2006-2007 season as saying he probably would have played had the Celtics not been in the hunt for a high draft pick. Mike Zarren, the Assistant GM for the Celtics during that time, was the one who came up with the wheel proposal, which became public last year.

2This slotted system has gradually gone through iterations over time, changing the amount of guaranteed years to finally settle at the current version, where a first round pick is guaranteed for seasons 1 and 2, then there are team options for seasons 3 and 4.

3There are certain requirements that, from all-nba selections, to being voted as a starter in all-star games, to earning an MVP that, if met, allow a player coming off of his rookie scale contract to earn more, called the 5th year 30% max criteria, adding in a 5th year to the contract and getting 30% of the cap rather than the customary 25% See Larry Coon’s FAQ for more details.

4$20,644,400 was the maximum starting salary that a player with 10+ years of experience was able to command this summer.

5The NBA’s salary cap is called a soft cap because there are exceptions that allow an over-the-cap team to continue adding players, including exceptions to re-sign your own free agents. Again, see Larry Coon’s FAQ for more details.

6Even without Bird rights teams can offer a contract starting at 120% of their salary from the previous season (but not beyond the maximum salary). So, even if LeBron James opts out of his contract after one season in Cleveland, they can still offer him 120% of his 2014-2015 salary, which is well above the max he can earn, despite his lack of Bird rights with Cleveland.

Looking At The Timberwolves As A Thaddeus Young Trade Partner

thad

The Sixers have long been mentioned as a potential suitor to the seemingly inevitable Kevin Love trade, and due to their cap space and willingness to absorb salary in return for assets will be rumored as a potential suitor until that trade is mercifully completed¹

It’s now being reported that not only could the Sixers help facilitate a Kevin Love to Cleveland trade, but that the Timberwovles are specifically targeting Sixers forward Thaddeus Young to replace the outbound Love.

This combination of the Sixers being able to facilitate a deal financially as well as having an asset that Minnesota is targeting is a pretty good combination for Sam Hinkie to generate leverage.  So what can Minnesota offer the Sixers?

Minnesota’s Future Draft Pick Situation

One of the assets that Sam Hinkie seems to consistently be targeting are future draft picks.  Unfortunately for the Sixers, Minnesota owes their 2015 1st round draft pick to Phoenix2.  The pick is top 12 protected in 2015 and 2016, and, if not conveyed by then, turns into a 2016 2nd round pick and a 2017 2nd round pick.  Odds are that Minnesota ends up not giving away this first round pick because of the protections, but because there’s the possibility that they will, and because they do not have any 1st round picks coming their way, Minnesota cannot trade a first round pick until at least 20173.  Not that a pick 3+ years down the road is something that Sam Hinkie isn’t willing to wait for, but it’s not something to get overly excited about at this stage of the game, unless there are virtually no protections on it from Minnesota’s side.

The 2nd round picks that Minnesota has aren’t all that much more interesting, as they owe their 2015 second round draft pick to Houston.  They do have an incoming 2015 second round pick from Denver, as well as an incoming 2017 second from New Orleans, but they both project to be much later in the draft than their own pick would have been.

Cleveland’s Future Draft Pick Situation

The more interesting picks would be the ones coming from Cleveland.  Cleveland is currently set to trade its 2016 first round pick to Boston (top 10 protected) in the Jarrett Jack salary dump from earlier this offseason.  However, Cleveland is set to have two 2015 1st round picks: Miami’s 2015 first rounder (top 10 protected), as well as the less-favorable pick between Cleveland and Chicago’s 2015 1st round picks.  Either of these could be had in a trade.

The most enticing pick, however, might be the pick that Cleveland is owed from Memphis.  The pick has weird protections: it is not conveyed if it falls in the top 5 OR between 15 and 30 in 2015 or 2016, but becomes only top 5 protected in 2017 and 2018, before finally being fully unprotected in 2019.

This as a smart move on Cleveland’s part, as the second half of the protections (protected 15-30 for the next two years) was an effort to try to increase the chances that the pick becomes a lottery pick.  Memphis declined slightly last year, from 56-26 to 50-32, coming in as the 7th seed in a tough Western Conference.  It’s no guarantee that the Grizzlies will make the playoffs both of the next two seasons.  Combine that with little chance of them being bad and falling into the top 5, and that’s a potential lottery pick that could be available.

However, it’s the chance that Memphis does make the playoffs the next two years that really becomes interesting, as Zach Randolph enters his mid-thirties and the chance that a top 10 pick becomes a realistic scenario.  If you can delay the gratification (and Sam Hinkie has shown that he is willing to do so), there’s a potentially very attractive pick available in this three team deal.

Young players of interest

With Minnesota’s interest in obtaining Young, their willingness to include a younger player may be spiked.  What do they have to offer?

The two most interesting names are their two most recent 1st round draft picks: Gorgui Dieng and Zach LaVine, drafted 21st in 2013 and 13th in 2014,  respectively.  Dieng averaged an impressive 12.2 points, 12.0 rebounds, and 1.7 blocks in 15 starts late in the season for the Wolves. LaVine is one of the more athletic wing prospects to come out in some time.  While I’m not necessarily his biggest fan, he’s the kind of long, athletic wing prospect that I could see Sam Hinkie targeting as a guy who could eventually out-shoot his expected contribution, if he can ever figure out the game.  I would be incredibly surprised if either of these guys are moved in the trade, though, as they’re the kind of young assets Minnesota is going to need in the long rebuild they’re about to enter.

The other names to keep an eye on are Shabazz Muhammad, Alexey Shved, and Chase Budinger.  Budinger is entering the second year of a 3 year contract4.  While he’s unlikely to have too much untapped potential, he’s useful and, at $5 million per year, on a relatively friendly contract.  Shved, at 25, has thus far struggled to become an efficient option on offense, but he has the kind of size, fluidity, and feel for the game that Sam Hinkie could have an interest in, and would fit right in with the Sixers other perimeter threats who aren’t much of a threat from the perimeter.  Muhammad, who slid down the first round in the 2013 draft all the way to 14th, struggled during his rookie season and played only 290 total minutes.  It’s hard to really see Muhammad as a Sam Hinkie type of player, with his defensive indifference, poor steal rate, mid-range based game, but he has only one guaranteed year left on his deal5, and it’s possible Hinkie could take him on as a talented reclamation project, but that would be as a throw-in to the deal, not as a centerpiece.

For the most part I haven’t touched on the Cavs players, mostly in the interest of brevity, and because those have been talked about extensively over the past few weeks.  This article was mostly centered around the new information, which was the Wolves interest in Thaddeus Young.  That being said, some of the Cavs players (Dion Waiters, mostly) are obviously in play.  Anthony Bennett has been rumored as well, but I would guess he is more likely to head to Minnesota.  That being said, the incredibly disappointed (but looking much better in summer league) former #1 overall pick is somebody to keep an eye on.

What else would the Sixers have to take back?

With the Wolves over the cap6, it’s very likely that the Sixers would have to take back a less-than-desirable contract to help facilitate the deal.  From the Wolves side, that would likely be Kevin Martin, who has three years and roughly $21 million remaining, with the final season being a team option. Martin would provide the Sixers with an offensive option from the perimeter and plays the “3 point and at-the-rim” style of offense that Hinkie and Brown are likely to employ (he has shot 38.5% from three point range for his career and averaged 6.0 free throw attempts per game in just under 31 minutes), but Martin will turn 32 later this year, has struggled with injuries throughout his career, and as such isn’t likely to be a long term piece for the teams future.  Ideally you wouldn’t want him eating into the teams cap space, as the Sixers are likely to start looking to supplement their drafting with finding supporting pieces through free agency.  But taking back Martin’s contract is likely the cost of doing business in this trade, and will allow the Sixers to raise their asking price, because not only are the Wolves getting a player they want (Thaddeus Young), but they’re also shedding an undesirable contract (Martin).  Martin would at least provide a little bit of relief on the offensive end and allow Michael Carter-Williams to play a role that he’s more likely to look to fill long term than being the top offensive option.

Outside of that, Minnesota’s cap situation is fairly positive.  They could take back Alexey Shved, who is on the final year of his rookie deal at $3.2 million.  I talked about Shved briefly above, and his combination of inconsistency from the perimeter and struggles finishing around the hoop make it a little bit grim whether he’d ever really contribute enough offensively.  He is wonderfully creative off the pick and roll, which could help the Sixers ball movement some in the half-court.  If he could ever develop consistency as a jump shooter7 he could carve a roll for himself in the NBA, but that’s an “if” at this point.

Summary

Assets available in a trade:

  • “First available” (2017) Minnesota 1st round draft pick
  • 2015 Miami first round pick (top 10 protected)
  • “Less favorable” 2015 1st round pick between Cleveland and Chicago
  • 2015 Memphis first round pick (protected 1-5, 15-30 in 2015 & 2016, protected 1-5 in 2017 & 2018, unprotected in 2019)
  • Young players like Gorgui Dieng, Zach LaVine, Alexey Shved, Chase Budinger, and Shabazz Muhammad.

In my opinion, the Memphis pick, as well as a future Minnesota pick (depending on the protections) are the two most intriguing assets that might actually be viable for the Sixers to obtain, although it would be difficult for me to see Minnesota giving up that high of a pick, even far down the line, in such a trade.

I haven’t mentioned Andrew Wiggins up to this point because I don’t think there’s any real chance the Sixers have in prying him away from Minnesota.  He is Minnesota’s prize in giving up Kevin Love, and nothing the Sixers have to offer can get him away from them, in my opinion.  Of course, I’d love to be wrong.

Unfortunately, because of the Andrew Wiggins signing, this is a rumor/situation that will drag one for quite a bit longer.

Footnotes:

1With Cleveland signing Andrew Wiggins, the trade (assuming Andrew Wiggins is involved in it) cannot be traded until 30 days have passed.  Wiggins signed on July 24th, meaning the earliest that he could be traded is August 23rd.  It also means that when Wiggins is traded his outgoing salary will count for roughly $5.5 million, assuming he gets 120% of the rookie scale contract for the #1 pick.  Had he previously been traded they would have been trading his draft rights, and his (expected) salary would not have been included in matching salaries for the trade.

2The Stepien rule dictates that a team can’t fail to have a first round pick in back to back years. Two key points on this rule: 1) It only deals with future picks owed, not the past. Meaning if a team didn’t have a pick in the 2014 draft, that’s irrelevant. They can actually not have a pick in 2014 and still trade their 2015 pick, it’s just they can’t fail to have a pick in the next two upcoming drafts. 2) It only specifies not having a pick, not necessarily not having their own pick. So if a team, say Minnesota, already is set to pay out their 2015 pick. They can trade their 2016 pick as well, as long as they acquire an additional first round pick in 2015 or 2016.

3Unless Minnesota acquires another pick in the deal. Remember, the Stepien rule just specifies that they cannot fail to have first round picks in consecutive years. If they acquire another one, they can trade their own pick 2 years in a row, although the Sixers would still have to wait until the debt to Phoenix has been paid, meaning the Sixers would get Minnesota’s first available pick.

42015-16, the final season in Budinger’s contract, is a player option.

5For rookie scale (first round pick) contracts, the first two seasons are guaranteed, then season three and four are team options. Muhammad is entering his second season, and the option for his third season would have to be picked up by the end of October, similar to the situation the Sixers were in when they acquired Royce White last summer.

6Even though the Sixers are under the cap, the Wolves are not, so they have to send out money in order to take on Thad’s contract. See Larry Coon’s excellent cbafaq.com for more information.

7So far Shved has shot 29.5% from nba three point range on 390 attempts in his nba career. He shot 23% overall on jump shots last season, 27.7% on catch and shoots jumpers, a horrible 16.2% on jump shots off the dribble, and 22.6% when he shoots off the pick and roll. All are well below average.